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SEEING RED: GIBBS v. BABBITT
EDWARD A. FITZGERALDt
I. INTRODUCTION
The reintroduction of the endangered red wolf into its historic
range in North Carolina has proved a controversial endeavor. In
1988, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) reintro-
duced red wolves into the Alligator River National Wildlife Refuge
(Refuge) in North Carolina pursuant to section 10(j) of the Endan-
gered Species Act (ESA).1 The red wolves prospered, even though
many migrated from the Refuge onto private lands. 2 In response to
public opposition, several counties in North Carolina enacted reso-
lutions objecting to the reintroduction. 3 North Carolina subse-
quently enacted a statute that permitted the taking of the red wolf
on private land under conditions that are more lenient than the
federal regulation. 4
t Professor, Wright State University. Ph.D. 1983, Boston University; M.A.
1976, Northeastern University; J.D. 1974, Boston College Law School; B.A. 1971,
Holy Cross College.
1. See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(j) (1995 & Supp. IV 1998). Section 10(j) of the En-
dangered Species Act [hereinafter ESA] allows the Fish and Wildlife Service [here-
inafter FWS] to designate as "experimental" some reintroduced populations of
endangered or threatened species. See id. For a detailed discussion of ESA § 10(j),
see infra note 227 and accompanying text. For a comprehensive overview of the
legislative history of § 10(j), see Edward A. Fitzgerald, Wyoming Farm Bureau Federa-
tion v. Babbitt: The Children of the Night Return to the Northern Rocky Mountains, 15 J.
ENERGY NAT. RES. & ENVrL. L. (forthcoming 2000-2001).
2. See Gibbs v. Babbitt, 31 F. Supp. 2d 531, 532 (E.D.N.C. 1998) [hereinafter
Gibbs 1].
3. See id. at 533.
4. See Trapping and Taking of Red Wolves by Owners of Private Land Act,
1994 N.C. Sess. Laws 299 (allowing owners of private land in North Carolina to
trap and take red wolves when confronted with particular circumstances).
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Several individuals and counties brought suit in a North Caro-
lina federal district court.5 The claimants alleged that the Com-
merce Clause does not allow the federal government to regulate
wildlife on private land, which is a traditional state function. 6 In
Gibbs v. Babbitt,7 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling and held that the Com-
merce Clause supports the federal regulation prohibiting the tak-
ing of the red wolf on private land."
Gibbs is significant because it is part of the changing Commerce
Clause jurisprudence. The Supreme Court recently resurrected
federalism to limit the federal government's regulatory authority.9
This new aggressive posture for the Court as the arbiter of federal
authority raises questions as to the future of environmental law, the
emergence of judicial activism, and the relationship between the
Court and Congress.' 0 The Gibbs decision is particularly important
5. See Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 489 (4th Cir. 2000), affg 31 F. Supp. 2d
531 (E.D.N.C. 1998), cert. denied, Gibbs v. Norton, 531 U.S. 1145 (2001) [hereinaf-
ter Gibbs I1].
6. See Gibbs I, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 533.
7. See Gibbs II, 214 F.3d at 483.
8. See id. at 506 (holding as "a basic maxim ofjudicial restraint" that Congress
may constitutionally address problem of protecting endangered species through
anti-taking regulation).
9. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); see also United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). From 1937 through 1995, the Supreme Court de-
ferred to congressional determinations that activities were sufficiently related to
interstate commerce in order to justify federal regulation pursuant to the com-
merce clause. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 554-55. The Court only asked whether the
decision was rational and whether the means chosen reasonably related to the
ends sought. See id. at 557. In 1995, the Court, in United States v. Lopez, changed
the conceptual framework for assessing federal commerce clause authority. See id.
at 549. In Lopez, the Court determined that the federal government may only regu-
late an intrastate activity that substantially affects interstate commerce if that intra-
state activity is economic in nature or is closely related to a larger economic
regulatory program. See id. at 560-62. The federal statute must contain jurisdic-
tional limits to distinguish federal and state regulation and avoid areas traditionally
left to states. See id. In United States v. Morrison, the Supreme Court reiterated the
conceptual framework. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
10. See Charles Tiefer, After Morrison, Can Congress Preserve Environmental Laws
From Commerce Clause Challenge?, 30 ENVrL. L. REP. 10888 (2000); see also Philip
Weinberg, Does the Line in the Sand Include Wetlands: Congressional Power and Environ-
mental Protection, 30 ENVrL. L. REP. 10894 (2000); Peter M. Shane, Federalism's "Old
Deal": What's Right and Wrong with Conservative Judicial Activism, 45 VILL. L. REv. 201
(2000) (discussing how United States Supreme Court is preserving structure of
United States Constitution as it applies to state and Congressional rights); Philip P.
Frickey, The Fool on the Hill: Congressional Findings, Constitutional Adjudication, and
United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 695 (1996); see, e.g., Brzonkala v.
Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820, 892 (4th Cir. 1999) (collect-
ing noteworthy cases ofjudicial activism); Barry Friedman, Legislative Findings and
Judicial Signals: A Positive Political Reading of U.S. v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REv.
757 (1996).
[Vol. XIII: p. I
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because the Fourth Circuit, more than any other circuit court, is
engaged in a continuing dialogue with the Supreme Court.1
This Article reviews the reintroduction of the red wolf into
North Carolina and analyzes the Fourth Circuit's decision in
Gibbs.12 It illustrates that the Fourth Circuit properly determined
that the federal regulation regarding the taking of the red wolf is
supported by the Commerce Clause. The red wolf is a migratory
creature that freely crosses state boundaries. 13 Protection of the
red wolf substantially impacts interstate commerce by promoting
tourism, scientific study, and the possible restoration of the fur bus-
iness; preserving biodiversity while helping to maintain the ecosys-
tem; and preventing harmful interstate commerce. 14  These
impacts were addressed in ESA's legislative history and have been
upheld by many courts. The anti-taking regulation has adequate
jurisdictional limits. Wildlife regulation is not an exclusive state
function. The Fourth Circuit's decision, in Gibbs, demonstrated
that United States v. Lopez15 does not necessarily signal the demise of
federal environmental statutes.
16
II. THE SAGA OF THE RED WOLF
The red wolf originally inhabited the southeastern region of
the United States from the Atlantic Ocean to central Texas and
Oklahoma, and from the Gulf of Mexico to central Missouri and
Illinois. 17 The habitat of the red wolf was the pristine river bottom-
lands, particularly the adjacent extensive "canebrakes" that har-
11. See Warren Richey, Two Kindred Courts Break Legal Ground, CHRISTIAN SCI-
ENCE MONITOR (June 19, 2000), available at http://www.csmonitor.com/cgi-bin/
getasciiarchive?script/2000/06/19/pls3.txt. Professor Rodney Smolla noted that
the Fourth Circuit "has shown some intellectual daring and a willingness to break
new ground." Id. According to Professor Smolla, the Fourth Circuit judges "are
taking leads from Supreme Court decisions and running with them, and that in
turn leads the Supreme Court to take what the Fourth Circuit has done and build
on it." Id.
12. For a further discussion of the Fourth Circuit's analysis in Gibbs II, see infra
notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
13. For a further discussion of the characterization of the red wolf as a "thing
in interstate commerce," see infra note 57 and accompanying text.
14. For a further discussion of the impact that protection of the red wolf has
on interstate commerce, see infra notes 69-187 and accompanying text.
15. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
16. See id. (holding that Gun-Free School Zones Act, making it federal offense
for any individual knowingly to possess firearm at place individual knows or has
reasonable cause to believe is school zone, exceeded Congress' Commerce Clause
authority, since possession of gun in local school zone was not economic activity
that substantially affected interstate commerce).
17. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Determination of
Experimental Population Status for an Introduced Population of Red Wolves in
20021
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bored large populations of swamp and marsh rabbits, the red wolf's
principal prey.18 Human activities, such as the drainage of lands
for agriculture, dam construction, and predator control led to the
red wolf's demise. 19 The red wolf was viewed as a nuisance even
though it was important to the ecosystem and it posed no threat to
livestock in areas where adequate prey was available. 20
The red wolf was forced into the lower Mississippi region and,
finally, into southeast Texas.21 In 1967, the Secretary of the Inte-
rior declared the red wolf an endangered species.22 Low numbers,
poor health and threats posed by inbreeding with coyotes nearly
drove the red wolf into extinction. 23 In the 1970s, FWS captured
the remaining red wolves and placed them in captive breeding pro-
grams for future reintroduction. 24 Several limited experimental re-
leases, in 1976 and in 1978, demonstrated that the red wolf could
successfully be reintroduced into the wild.25
In 1986, FWS proposed the reintroduction of the red wolf into
the Alligator River National Wildlife Refuge.2 6 The refuge pro-
vided an ideal habitat for the red wolf as it consisted of 120,000
acres of wetlands in northeastern North Carolina.27 From Septem-
North Carolina, 51 Fed. Reg. 41790, 41791 (Nov. 19, 1986) (codified at 50 C.F.R.
pt. 17).
18. See Gibbs II, 214 F.3d at 488 (citing Endangered and Threatened Wildlife
and Plants; Determination of Experimental Population Status for an Introduced
Population of Red Wolves in North Carolina, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,790, 41,791 (Nov. 19,
1986)).
19. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Determination of
Experimental Population Status for an Introduced Population of Red Wolves in
North Carolina, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,790, 41,791 (Nov. 19, 1986).
20. See id. (discussing reintroduction of mated red wolves).
21. See id.
22. See Gibbs II, 214 F.3d at 488.
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Determination of
Experimental Population Status for an Introduced Population of Red Wolves in
North Carolina, 51 Fed. Reg. 41790, 41,791 (Nov. 19, 1986) (describing release of
mated pairs of red wolves onto Bulls Island, part of Cape Romain National Wildlife
Refuge near Charleston, South Carolina).
26. See id.
27. See id. (discussing additional reintroduction site for red wolves at Great
Smokey Mountain National Park). The Alligator River National Wildlife Refuge
was not the only site for red wolf reintroduction. In 1991, the FWS and National
Park Service (NPS) reintroduced the red wolf into Great Smokey Mountain Na-
tional Park. The experimental population area included Haywood and Swain
counties in North Carolina and Bount, Cocke, and Deveier counties in Tennessee.
A single family of red wolves was introduced into the Cades Cove area of the Park
to assess the feasibility of establishing a wolf population. FWS wanted to learn how
the wolves would acclimate to a mountain terrain where there was a great deal of
human and livestock activity and a large coyote population. FWS also sought to
[Vol. XIII: p. I
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ber 14, 1987, through September 30, 1992, a total of forty-two
wolves were released on fifteen separate occasions. 28 The red
wolves were introduced as a nonessential experimental population
pursuant to section 10(j) of ESA.29 Section 10(j) requires that the
experimental population be released outside the current range of
the natural population and be geographically separate from the
natural population.3° Since no red wolves existed in the wild, the
Alligator River Refuge satisfied these requirements. 31
discover if it could cooperate with local officials. The initial study proved
favorable. In 1993, the experimental population area was expanded to include
Graham, Jackson, and Madison counties in North Carolina and Monroe County in
Tennessee. From 1992 through 1996, another thirty-seven red wolves were intro-
duced into Great Smokey Mountain National Park. FWS's goal was three sus-
taining populations with at least 220 animals. See generally Endangered and
Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Proposed Revision of the Special Rule for Nones-
sential Experimental Populations of Red Wolves in North Carolina and Tennessee,
58 Fed. Reg. 62,086 (Nov. 24, 1993).
FWS and NPS decided to terminate red wolf reintroduction into the Park in
1998. There had been a very low pup survival rate because of parvovirus and com-
mon canid diseases, internal and external parasites, poor nutrition, and predation
by black bears and coyotes. The wolves were unable to develop home ranges
within the Park. Of the thirty-seven wolves released, twenty-six were recaptured or
died outside of Park boundaries. The low availability of prey in the dense forest
was suspected as the cause for the wolves straying from the Park. The remaining
wolves were recaptured and returned to the captive breeding program. No red
wolves were left in the Park for fear that they might breed with the coyotes and
thereby weaken the gene pool. The existing regulations continued to apply in the
region. See generally 63 Fed. Reg. 54,152 (Oct. 8, 1998).
28. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Proposed Revision
of the Special Rule for Nonessential Experimental Populations of Red Wolves in
North Carolina and Tennessee, 58 Fed. Reg. 62,086 (Nov. 24, 1993). Of the forty-
two wolves released, twenty-two died, seven were returned to captivity for manage-
ment reasons, eleven remained free ranging, while the fate of two remains un-
known. See id. The length of time the red wolves spent in the wild ranged from
sixteen days to three and one-half years. See id. At least twenty-two wolves were
born in the wild. See id. Only two wild born wolves died, but only one can be
accounted for. See id. Wild born wolves accounted for sixty-three percent of the
population (19 of 30). See id. Of the eleven wolves that bred in the wild, one was
wild born, and ten were born in captive breeding programs. See id. The wild pups
dispersed from their natural home ranges. See id. They traveled up to 192 kilome-
ters before establishing their own home range on private land south or west of
Alligator Refuge. See id. Twenty-four of the reintroduced wolves were recaptured
sixty-three times and seventeen of the wild wolves were recaptured thirty-nine
times to meet program objectives, such as replacing collars, placing wolf with mate,
or translocating an animal to suitable site. See id.
29. See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(j) (1995 & Supp. IV 1998). Many red wolves re-
mained in captive breeding programs to ensure there was no threat to the species.
30. See id.
31. See id. Under § 10(j), members of an experimental population are treated
as a threatened species when on federal land, but as a species proposed for listing,
a less protective category, when located off federal land. See id. The Secretary of
the Interior can establish flexible regulations regarding the experimental popula-
tion to ease public concerns. See id.
2002]
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The experimental population reintroduction area initially in-
cluded Dare, Tyrell, Washington, and Hyde Counties in North Car-
olina.32 Federal regulations originally allowed for the taking of a
red wolf in this area for educational, scientific, zoological, and con-
servation purposes; to defend a person's life or the life of another;
to preclude any threat to human safety; or to prevent the depreda-
tion of domestic animals or personal property.33 The regulations
required the taking to be reported immediately.34 The interstate
transport of any red wolf taken in violation of these regulations was
prohibited. 35 FWS monitored and vaccinated the red wolves, which
were recaptured and returned if they strayed from the refuge.36
The regulations changed in 1991. 37 Following the change, a
red wolf could be taken incidental to a lawful recreational activity
or to defend human life. 38 A landowner could harass a red wolf
that was pursuing or killing livestock on private property, but could
not kill or injure the wolf.3 9 Additionally, a landowner could take
the wolf to protect livestock actually pursued or being killed on pri-
vate property after efforts to recapture the depredating wolf proved
unsuccessful. 40 FWS could take a red wolf if it could not stop the
wolf's depredation. 41
There have been two unsuccessful efforts to delist the red wolf
as an endangered species. In 1992, the American Sheep Industry
Association asserted that the red wolf was not a distinct species, but
a wolf-coyote hybrid. 42 FWS determined that the evidence did not
32. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Determination of
Experimental Population Status for an Introduced Population of Red Wolves in
North Carolina, 51 Fed. Reg. at 41,792, 41,793 (Nov. 19, 1986).
33. See Endangered and Protected Wildlife and Plants, Experimental Popula-
tions, 50 C.F.R. § 17.84(c) (1986)(governing experimental populations in North
Carolina and Tennessee pursuant to § 10(j)).
34. See id. (limiting transport of red wolves).
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See 50 C.F.R. § 17.84(c). For a description of the regulation changes, see
infra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
38. See 50 C.F.R. § 17.84(c) (4) (i).
39. See 50 C.F.R. § 17.84(c) (4) (iv).
40. See 50 C.F.R. § 17.84(c).
41. See id. The regulations were modified again in 1995, but remained essen-
tially the same. See ENDANGERED AND THREATENED WILDLIFE AND PLANTS; REVISION
OF THE SPECIAL RULE FOR NONESSENTIAL EXPERIMENTAL POPUATiONS OF RED
WOLVES IN NORTH CAROLINA AND TENNESSEE, 60 Fed. Reg. 18,940 (Apr. 13, 1995).
42. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Finding on a Peti-
tion to Delist the Red Wolf (Canis rufus), 57 Fed. Reg. 1,246 (Jan. 13, 1992) (re-
jecting petition for finding red wolf is coyote/wolf hybrid and therefore not
entitled to endangered status). The American Sheeping Industry Association
sought to: (1) remove red wolves from the list of endangered species; (2) suspend
[Vol. XIII: p. 1
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warrant delisting and indicated that the red wolf was a distinct spe-
cies. 43 In 1997, the National Wildlife Institute moved to delist the
red wolf, asserting that the red wolf was a hybrid not essential to the
species' survival.44 Again, FWS rejected the proposal, citing new ev-
idence that the red wolf was not a hybrid. 45
III. GIBBS V. BABBITr
Many in North Carolina opposed the reintroduction of the red
wolf.46 In October 1990, Richard Mann shot and killed a red wolf
that he feared might threaten his cattle and his property.47 The
federal government prosecuted Mann for illegally taking a wolf
under 50 C.F.R. § 17.84(c). 48 Mann pled guilty to the offense and
received a sentence, requiring him to build wolf houses and to feed
the wolves.49 There was, however, a great deal of sympathy for
Mann in the region. 50 In response to the public opposition to the
protection of red wolves on private land and the fear of federal gov-
ernment interference in private land use, several North Carolina
counties passed resolutions opposing red wolf reintroduction. 51 In
1994, North Carolina passed "[a]n Act to Allow the Trapping and
Killing of Red Wolves by Owners of Private Land," permitting the
taking of red wolves on private land under limited circumstances. 52
The Act initially involved Hyde and Washington counties, but was
expanded to include Beaufort and Craven counties. This state law
contradicted federal regulation dealing with the taking of red
any releases of the red wolf into Alabama, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North
and South Carolina, and Tennessee; and (3) terminate the funding for the red
wolf program.
43. See id. (announcing red wolf will not be removed from list of Endangered
Species).
44. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; 90-day Finding for a
Petition to Delist the Red Wolf, 62 Fed. Reg. 64,799 (Dec. 9, 1997).
45. See id. (indicating insufficient scientific or commercial information ex-
isted to justify delisting red wolves).
46. For a further discussion of the opposition to red wolf reintroduction, see
supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
47. See Gibbs I, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 533.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See Gibbs II, 214 F.3d at 489. In 1992, Hyde and Washington Counties and
the towns of Bellhaven and Roper in North Carolina passed resolutions opposing
red wolf reintroduction. See id.
52. Trapping and Taking of Red Wolves by Owners of Private Land Act, 1994
N.C. Sess. Laws 299 (allowing owners of private land in North Carolina to trap and
take red wolves when landowner reasonably believes red wolf may be threat to
people or livestock and landowner previously requested FWS to remove red wolf),
amended by 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 83.
2002]
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wolves on private land. 53 Yet, no conflict between the federal and
state law ever occurred.
On March 3, 1997, Charles Gibbs and Richard Mann, as private
individuals, with Hyde and Washington Counties, filed suit, chal-
lenging the federal anti-taking regulation for violating the Com-
merce Clause. 54 They sought an injunction to stop the program on
private land, alleging the red wolf is a nuisance and federal protec-
tion of the red wolf precluded any effective defense of their
property.55
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
North Carolina, on cross motions for summary judgment, rejected
plaintiffs' claims and found that Congress' power to regulate inter-
state commerce included the authority to prevent the taking of red
wolves on private land.56 The court determined that the red wolves
are "things in interstate commerce" because they cross state lines
and their movement is followed by "tourists, academics, and scien-
tists." 57 Each of these activities has economic consequences, which
substantially affect interstate commerce. The court concluded that
the anti-taking regulation is "a legitimate exercise of federal power
under the Commerce Clause. '5 8 Gibbs, Mann, and the two coun-
ties in North Carolina appealed the decision.
The Fourth Circuit determined that the anti-taking regulation
was a valid exercise of Congress' power under the Commerce
Clause because it was economic in nature and part of a larger regu-
latory scheme.5 9 The court found that the cumulative impact of
individual takings of the red wolf substantially affect interstate com-
merce by: (1) precluding tourism, scientific study, and the possibil-
ity of a renewed trade in wolf pelts; (2) decreasing biodiversity and
frustrating efforts to maintain the ecosystem; and (3) encouraging
states to lower their wildlife protection standards to achieve inter-
53. See Endangered and Protected Wildlife and Plants, Experimental Popula-
tions, 50 C.F.R. § 17.84(c) (4) (iii). The federal regulation only allowed a taking in
specific instances when the wolf was in the act of killing livestock or pets or when
wounded or dead livestock or pets were present and the taking was reported within
twenty-four hours. See id.
54. See Gibbs I, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 532.
55. See id. at 489.
56. See id. at 535 (concluding there is clear nexus between protection of red
wolves and interstate commerce which validates regulation as legitimate exercise of
federal power).
57. Id. at 535 (noting that many persons travel from other states to attend red
wolf "howling events").
58. See id. at 536 (noting that each act of Congress is entitled to "strong pre-
sumption of validity and constitutionality.").
59. See Gibbs II, 214 F.3d at 483.
[Vol. XIII: p. I
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state market advantages. 60 The court held that wildlife regulation is
not solely within state authority. Federal regulation is necessary
when state wildlife regulation is inadequate. 61 The anti-taking regu-
lation was not found to disrupt state conservation authority because
federal authority is limited to endangered and threatened species. 62
The Fourth Circuit, in Gibbs, further noted it would not sec-
ond-guess the wisdom of the policy, which is a legislative function.63
Congress determines whether the preservation of a species is a fed-
eral responsibility. 64 The regulation is presumed to be constitu-
tional and the burden of proof is on those challenging the
regulation.65 While the Supreme Court's new Commerce Clause
jurisprudence protects the states, it does not disassemble federal
authority.
IV. ANALYsIs
The analytical framework the Fourth Circuit applies, in Gibbs, is
set forth in United States v. Lopez.66 The Supreme Court, in Lopez,
struck down the Gun Free School Zone Act, holding that the fed-
eral government's Commerce Clause authority extends to: (1) the
channels of interstate commerce; (2) the instrumentalities of inter-
state commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce; and
(3) activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce. 67
The federal government may regulate intrastate "activities that arise
out of or are connected with a commercial transaction, which
viewed in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate com-
merce."68 Lopez determined that intrastate activities can also be reg-
ulated if they are "an essential part of a larger regulation of
60. See id. at 493-99 (holding that there is rational basis for sustaining
regulation).
61. See id. at 499-504. "If the federal government cannot regulate the taking
of an endangered or threatened species on private land . . . [that ruling] would
place in peril the entire federal regulatory scheme for wildlife and natural re-
source conservation." Id. at 504.
62. See id. at 499-504.
63. See id.
64. See id. at 504.
65. See Gibbs II, 214 F.3d at 505-07 (stating regulation is presumed to be consti-
tutional and that burden of proof is on those challenging regulation).
66. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
67. See id. (indicating broad categories of activity that Congress may regulate
through its commerce power).
68. Id. at 561 (noting such regulations will be upheld).
2002]
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economic activity," which can "be undercut unless the intrastate ac-
tivity were regulated." 69
The Lopez Court further considered the importance of legisla-
tive findings. 70 Both the majority and the dissenting opinions
agreed that specific legislative findings are not necessary, but may
help "to evaluate the legislative judgment that the activity in ques-
tion substantially affected interstate commerce."71 Nevertheless,
the Court cautioned that "simply because Congress may conclude
that a particular activity substantially affects interstate commerce
does not necessarily make it so."72 This language indicates that a
search through "the ashcans of the legislative process" is important
not only to decipher the intent and purpose of the statute, but also
to determine its constitutionality.
Congress' setting forth the nexus between the regulated activ-
ity and interstate commerce serves many interests. It puts state and
local officials on notice to respond and promotes congressional de-
liberation. Moreover, it reinforces due process, encourages public
scrutiny and political accountability, and fosters institutional dia-
logue.73 Establishing the nexus is not a clearly factual or legal de-
termination, but a shared endeavor in which each institution must
participate.74 When Congress demonstrates the link, it facilitates
the Court's role and precludes the appearance of judicial activism.
69. Id. at 561 (emphasizing that 18 U.S.C. § 9 22(q), as subject of Lopez case, is
criminal statute with nothing to do with interstate commerce, and, therefore, is
not part of larger regulation of interstate activity).
70. See id. at 563.
71. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 612-14 (Souter, J., dissenting) (determining that neither
statute nor its legislative history contain congressional findings regarding effects
upon interstate commerce of gun possession in school zone).
72. See id. at 557 n.2 (citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface & Mining Ass'n, 452
U.S. 264, 311 (1981) (holding Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act [here-
inafter SMCRA] constitutional).
73. See Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and
Principle?, 111 IHARV. L. REv. 2180, 2231-46 (1998) (examining federal regulation of
private activity and role of Congress as most competent and suited institution to
resolve state and local government concern about reach of federal regulation); see
generally, Frickey, supra note 10, at 728 (addressing post-Lopez question of role that
congressional process plays in reviewing constitutionality of federal legislation es-
poused pursuant to commerce power); see also Harold J. Krent, Turning Congress
into an Agency: The Propriety of Requiring Legislative Findings, 46 CASE W. REs. L. REv.
731, 74347 (1996)(discussing relationship between Congress and judiciary and
question of whether judiciary should provide greater attention to congressional
process of enacting legislation).
74. See Frickey, supra note 10, at 716, noting:
In the final analysis, merely calling a question one of fact, and therefore
for the legislature, or one of law, and therefore for courts, substitutes
result-oriented labeling for careful institutional analysis. A realistic ap-
praisal suggests that 'characterizing a matter as one of law or of fact is no
[Vol. XIII: p. I
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Requiring Congress to establish the link is analogous to princi-
ples the Court set forth in other cases. The "hard look doctrine," in
Motor Vehicles Manufacturing Association v. State Farm Mutual Automo-
bile Insurance,75 requires agencies to "examine the relevant data and
articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a 'ra-
tional connection between the facts found and the choice
made.' "76 In addition, the "clear statement principle" that the Su-
preme Court articulated in Gregory v. Ashcrof177 "ensures that the leg-
islature has in fact faced, and intended to bring into issue, the
critical matters involved in the judicial decision."78
A. Things in Interstate Commerce
Lopez permits the federal government to regulate "things in in-
terstate commerce." 79 The federal district court, in Gibbs, properly
held that the anti-taking provision can be supported as a regulation
of "things in interstate commerce."80 The red wolf is a migratory
creature, originally inhabiting the entire southeastern region of the
United States.81 By the early 20th century, the red wolf was present
in only fourteen states, but was concentrated in Texas, Mississippi,
more than a conclusion, based upon an evaluation of pertinent policies,
that one branch of government rather than another should make the
decision in question.' In this realm, prudence suggests there should be
an intermediate ground between judicial or congressional monopoly on
constitutional interpretation, especially on questions of congressional
power.
Id. at 715-16 (citing Saul M. Pilchen, Politics v. the Cloister: Deciding Wen the Supreme
Court Should Defer to Congressional Factfinding Under the Post-Civil War Amendments, 59
NoTRE DAME L. REv. 337, 396-97 (1984)).
75. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
76. Id. at 43 (citing Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S.
156, 168 (1962)). The Supreme Court held that the decision of the National
Highway Transportation Safety Association to rescind its passive restraint require-
ment standard was arbitrary and capricious. See id. at 46.
77. 501 U.S. 452 (1991)(upholding Missouri Constitution mandatory retire-
ment provision for Missouri state court judges).
78. Id. at 461 (citing United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971)).
79. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). "Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate com-
merce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities." Id. at 558
(emphasis added).
80. Gibbs I, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 535. The Fourth Circuit disagreed with the dis-
trict court on this point. See Gibbs II, 214 F.3d at 491. "This case .. .does not
implicate Lopez's second prong, which protects things in interstate commerce. Al-
though the [Fish and Wildlife] Service has transported the red wolves interstate...
this is not sufficient to make the red wolf a 'thing' in interstate commerce." Id.
81. For a further discussion of the migratory nature of the red wolf, see supra
notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
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Louisiana, and Arkansas. 8 2 From 1920 through 1950, aggressive
predator control extinguished the red wolf from its historic
range.83 By 1970, only 200 to 300 red wolves remained in Texas
and Louisiana. 84 The red wolves were captured and sent to captive
breeding programs throughout the United States. 85 If the rein-
troduction is successful, the red wolves will again cross state bound-
aries and repopulate the southeast region.
The Supreme Court first recognized federal authority over mi-
gratory species in Missouri v. Holland,8 6 which upheld the Migratory
Bird Treaty Act.87 The Court noted that since "the subject matter is
only transitorily within the State and has no permanent habitat
therein," the birds "can only be protected by national action."88
The Court warned that without the statute, there soon might be no
birds for any authority to protect. 89 Subsequently, several circuit
courts determined that migratory birds are objects of interstate
commerce that are subject to federal regulation because they travel
between states.9 0
B. Substantial Effect on Interstate Commerce
According to the Lopez decision, the federal government can
regulate activities, whatever their nature, provided that the activities
"arise out of or are connected with a commercial transaction, which
viewed in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate com-
82. See id.
83. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Determination of
Experimental Population Status for an Introduced Population of Red Wolves in
North Carolina, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,970, 41,970 (Nov. 19, 1986).
84. See Last Chance for the American Wolf, 119 CONG. REC. 8951-52 (Mar. 20,
1973) (statement of Rep. William Whitehurst of Va.).
85. See id. (referring to Congress' plan to continue direct predator control of
red wolf).
86. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
87. See id. (upholding federal statutes and regulations resulting from migra-
tory bird treaty between United States and Great Britain).
88. Id. at 435 (discussing why national action can achieve necessary uniform
regulation of migratory birds).
89. See id. (emphasizing that migratory birds' survival is direct cause of federal
legislative action).
90. See, e.g., Cerritos Gun Club v. Hall, 96 F.2d 620, 623 (9th Cir. 1938). The
migratory wild fowl are owned by the states, are capable of domestication and are
domesticated and possessed, and, like grazing cattle wandering from one state to
another, are in interstate commerce as they move across state boundary lines. See
id.; see also Cochrane v. United States, 92 F.2d 623, 627 (7th Cir. 1937) (announcing
that framers intended federal government to protect national property that is im-
possible to possess, such as migratory birds).
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SEEING RED
merce."91 The federally regulated intrastate activity need not be ec-
onomic in nature.92
The taking of the red wolf on private land substantially affects
interstate commerce because it harms tourism, scientific study and
any potential fur pelt business. 93 Killing the red wolf also decreases
biodiversity that provides products for future commerce and frus-
trates ecosystem management, which has interstate impacts.
9 4
Moreover, states with lower wildlife protection standards are given
an unfair competitive advantage.
Congress clearly recognized these impacts as significant in
ESA. Species extinction is caused primarily by habitat destruction,
pollution, and hunting, resulting from economic activities related
to interstate commerce. In order to stop species extinction, Con-
gress prohibited intrastate and interstate activities jeopardizing en-
dangered and threatened species. The prohibition preserves the
species' present and future benefits and precludes harmful inter-
state commerce. Many courts have found that these impacts pro-
vide a sufficient nexus to interstate commerce. Furthermore, the
anti-taking regulation is an essential component of a larger regula-
tory scheme.9 5 Since the anti-taking regulation is economic in na-
ture and part of a larger regulatory framework, courts must
91. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995).
92. See United States v. Olin Corp., 107 F.3d 1506, 1510-11 (1lth Cir. 1999)
(upholding Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act [hereinafter CERCLA] ban regarding on-site disposal of hazardous waste).
The court concluded that CERCLA can be applied constitutionally under the cir-
cumstances of the case because the legislative history of the Act documents how
the unregulated management of hazardous substances, even strictly within individ-
ual states, significantly impacts interstate commerce. See id. at 1511. In United
States v. Bird, the Fifth Circuit acknowledged that on-site disposal is a non-eco-
nomic intrastate activity, but is part of a larger regulatory scheme, substantially
affecting interstate commerce by controlling the disposal of harmful chemicals.
See United States v. Bird, 124 F.3d 667, 675-82 (5th Cir. 1997).
The Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Wilson, used similar reasoning to up-
hold the Federal Access Clinic Entrances Act [hereinafter FACE], regulating the
intrastate activities of abortion protestors. See United States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675,
686-88 (7th Cir. 1995). The Seventh Circuit recognized that regulated intrastate
activities do not have to be economic, but need only substantially affect interstate
commerce. See id. If abortion protestors close abortion clinics, women will be una-
ble to travel interstate to receive reproductive services. See id.; see also Terry v.
Reno, 101 F.3d 1412, 1417 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (stating non-commercial, anti-abortion
protests that reduce availability of abortion clinics substantially affect interstate
commerce).
93. For a further discussion of the effects of taking red wolves, see infra notes
98-121 and accompanying text.
94. For a further discussion of biodiversity and ecosystem management, see
infra notes 139-211 and accompanying text.
95. See Gibbs II, 214 F.3d at 483.
2002]
13
Fitzgerald: Seeing Red: Gibbs v. Babbitt
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2002
14 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL
consider the cumulative impact of the taking of the red wolves and
not individual red wolf takings.96
1. Tourism
The Fourth Circuit, in Gibbs, correctly held that the taking of a
red wolf substantially affects interstate commerce.9 7 The court rec-
ognized that there is a direct connection between the taking of the
red wolf and interstate commerce. 98 Absent red wolves, there will
be no related interstate tourism or scientific study and no commer-
cial trade in pelts.9 9 It is not necessary to pile inference upon infer-
ence to support this conclusion. 100
The desire of people to encounter and experience wildlife gen-
erates revenue through ecotourism.1 01 Tourists cross state lines to
see and hear the red wolves in North Carolina. One study esti-
mated that tourism to see the red wolves would generate between
$39.61 and $184 million per year in northeastern North Carolina
and between $132 and $354 million per year in the Greater Smokey
Mountain National Park.102 Scientists also travel to North Carolina
to study the red wolf. The movement of tourists and scientists con-
stitutes interstate commerce subject to federal regulation.103
96. See id.
97. See Gibbs II, 214 F.3d at 492-97 (determining that taking of red wolf is
within three categories of activities Congress is authorized to regulate under Com-
merce Clause).
98. See id. (discussing why taking of red wolf implicates variety of commercial
retail activities, connects interstate hunting markets, and preserves scarce natural
resources for future benefit of all Americans).
99. See id.
100. See id. at 492.
101. SeeJohn C. Nagle, Playing Noah, 82 MINN. L. REv. 1171, 1209 (1998) (cit-
ing James D. Caudill, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 1991 Economic Impacts of
Non-Consumptive Wildlife Related Recreation 6-7 (1997)). A 1991 FWS report
determined that 76 million Americans watched and photographed birds and wild-
life and spent over $18.1 billion in the process. See id. This generated $3 billion in
tax revenues and created 766,600 jobs. See id. at 1209. Another report found that
bird watching produced $15 billion annually. See id. A 1996 report by the Defend-
ers of the Wildlife concluded that wildlife tourism generated $29.2 billion per year.
See Gibbs II, 214 F.3d at 493-94.
102. See Gibbs II, 214 F.3d at 493-94 (citing William E. Rosen, Red Wolf Recov-
ery in Northeastern North Carolina and the Great Smoky Mountains National
Park: Public Attitudes and Economic Impacts (unpublished, Joint Appendix at
663)).
103. See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 256 (1964) (cit-
ing Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 320 (1913) (finding it well-established that
.commerce among the [s]tates... consists of intercourse and traffic between their
citizens.").
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Forty-one of the seventy-five red wolves in North Carolina live
on private land. 10 4 The red wolves migrate between the refuge and
private land. Their takings on private land can be regulated to pro-
tect their economic role on public land. Congress may regulate ac-
tivities outside the refuge that affect activities within the refuge,
particularly when these activities are the reason for interstate
travel.10 5 Congress may regulate the quality of commerce, as well as
its magnitude. 10 6 Consumer activity that occurs after interstate
commerce has been completed may also be protected. 10 7
A potential business opportunity exists in wolf pelts. In the
past, wolves were hunted for their pelts. If the red wolf is restored,
commerce in their pelts may be rekindled. Both the federal gov-
ernment and private businesses have recognized the value of wolf
pelts.108 Tourism, scientific study, and future commercial potential
provides a sufficient nexus to interstate commerce to prohibit the
taking of the red wolf. The importance of endangered species to
interstate commerce is manifest in many legislative findings and
congressional reports. 10
9
104. See Gibbs II, 214 F.3d at 488 (noting migratory tendency of red wolf origi-
nally reintroduced on private land).
105. SeeJoseph L. Sax, Helpless Giants: The National Parks and the Regulation of
Private Lands, 75 MICH. L. REv. 239, 256-58 (1976) (finding quality of commercial
activities impaired by interstate travel undertaken to experience such activities).
106. See id. at 257 (citing Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954)). "Just as
Congress, with plenary power over the District of Columbia, may legislate to sus-
tain the quality of life there, so, it would seem, may Congress, with full authority
over the parks and the interstate travel to them, legislate broadly to protect the
quality of the park experience." Id. at 257 n.92.
107. See id. (interpreting Congress' authority under Commerce Clause to in-
clude "ultimate consumer activity" that occurs after interstate commerce itself ter-
minates). Sax noted:
The fact that the activity is. . . not itself a part of commercial dealings...
does not invalidate the federal power. For the question is not whether
the activity itself is an element of interstate commerce, but whether com-
merce is 'pinched' by the activity or by a class of activities of which an
individual instance may itself be a trifling part whose contribution has not
been proven.
Id. at 257.
108. See Last Chance for the American Wolf, 119 CONG. REc. 8951, 8952 (Mar.
20, 1973) (statement of Rep. William Whitehurst of Va.). In 1973, the Department
of Defense ordered 368,782 winter parkas with wolf fur trim, which would have
necessitated killing more than 25,000 wolves. See id. Wilt Chamberlain, the former
basketball star, bought a full year's crop of wolf pelts collected by bounty hunters
in Alaska to make a rug and bedspread and cover two couches. See id. The Fourth
Circuit, in Gibbs v. Babbitt, noted that a hunter in British Columbia can earn $300
per wolf pelt. See Gibbs II, 214 F.3d at 503 (remarking that red wolf pelts are highly
valuable to consumers).
109. See, e.g., Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (a) (3) (2000) (explain-
ing that Congress determined endangered "species of fish, wildlife, and plants are
of esthetic, ecological, educational, historical, recreational, and scientific value to
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Numerous cases have held that tourism, scientific study and
commercial activities establish a sufficient nexus with interstate
commerce. A federal district court, in Palila v. Hawaii Department of
Land and Natural Resources,110 determined that Hawaii had commit-
ted an unlawful taking of the endangered palila by maintaining fe-
ral goats and sheep for hunting that were destroying the palila
habitat.' 11 Even though the palila was found only in one state, its
extinction would substantially affect interstate commerce. 112 The
court noted that ESA "preserves the possibilities of interstate com-
merce in these species and of interstate movement of persons, such
as amateur students of nature or professional scientists who come
to a state to observe and study these species, that would otherwise
be lost by state inaction." 113 The Ninth Circuit subsequently af-
firmed the district court's holding.'14
The Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Byrd," 5 determined that
contiguous wetlands are subject to federal jurisdiction pursuant to
the Clean Water Act (CWA), finding that filling in adjacent wet-
lands can affect interstate waters.1 6 Out-of-state residents visit in-
trastate waters. Adjacent wetlands are important to maintain the
quality of the intrastate waters." 17 If intrastate waters are degraded,
out-of-state residents will not come, causing an adverse impact on
interstate commerce.
The Tenth Circuit, in Utah v. Marsh," 8 prohibited the state
from filling an intrastate lake that was used by interstate travelers
the Nation and its people."). Congress also found that "the protection of an en-
dangered species with some commercial value may permit the regeneration of that
species to a level where controlled exploitation of that species can be resumed." S.
REP. No. 91-526, at 3 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1413, 1415.
110. 471 F. Supp. 985 (D. Haw. 1979), affd, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981).
111. See id.
112. See id. (holding that Tenth Amendment does not restrict enforcement of
ESA, even with respect to species that is present in only one state).
113. See id. at 995.
114. See Palila v. Hawaii Dept. of Land and Natural Res., 639 F.2d 495, 498
(9th Cir. 1981) (holding that State of Hawaii's game management practices involv-
ing feral goats and sheep in palila's habitat constituted unlawful taking as defined
by Act).
115. 609 F.2d 1204 (7th Cir. 1979) (affirming district court's judgment that
permanently enjoined defendant Byrd from placing any fill "on wetlands on his
property without obtaining a permit from Army Corps of Engineers.").
116. See id. at 1210 (finding that destruction of wetlands around lake could
impair attraction of lake for interstate travelers).
117. See id. at 1209-11 (concluding that "Congress constitutionally may extend
its regulatory control of navigable waters under the Commerce Clause to wetlands
which adjoin or are contiguous to intrastate lakes that are used by interstate trav-
elers for water-related recreational purposes.").
118. 740 F.2d 799 (10th Cir. 1984).
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for recreation, to irrigate crops sold in interstate commerce, and to
support interstate commercial fisheries.' 9 The Tenth Circuit held
that Congress can regulate local activities that impact interstate
commerce. 120 The movement of tourists between states creates a
sufficient connection to interstate commerce, making the action
subject to federal Commerce Clause authority. 21
The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Bramble,122 upheld the
Bald Eagle Protection Act (BEPA), which prohibits any commerce
and possession of eagles and their parts.1 2 3 The Ninth Circuit de-
clared that the extinction of eagles forecloses several types of com-
mercial activities, including "future commerce in eagles or parts,
future interstate travel to observe and study eagles, [and] future
beneficial products derived from eagles through an analysis of their
genetic material." 124
A lesson may also be learned from the standing jurisprudence.
To establish standing, a party bringing suit must show an injury in
fact. 125 The type of injury shown may also demonstrate a sufficient
nexus to interstate commerce.1 26 The Supreme Court, in Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife (DOW),127 held that the denial of the right to
see and study an endangered or threatened species constitutes a
119. See id. (holding that discharge of dredged or fill material into Utah Lake
by plaintiff or others could well have substantial economic effect on interstate
commerce).
120. See id. at 803 (holding Congress' power to promote interstate commerce
also includes power to regulate local incidents thereof).
121. See id. at 804. Non-residents fish, hunt, boat, water ski, camp, and take
photographs of the lake while visiting. See id. at 803; see also Heart of Atlanta Hotel
v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 256 (1964) (holding public accommodations provi-
sions of Civil Rights Act of 1964 valid under Commerce Clause).
122. 103 F.3d 1475 (9th Cir. 1996) (upholding EPA authority through valid
exercise of commerce power with reasoning adopted from Missouri v. Holland,
252 U.S. 416 (1920)).
123. See 16 U.S.C. § 668 (1994). The Bramble court looked at the substantial
effect of trade and possession of eagle parts on interstate commerce. See United
States v. Bramble, 103 F.3d 1475, 1481 (9th Cir. 1996). The possibility of eagle
extinction arose when clauses were aggregated together. See id.
124. See Bramble, 103 F.3d at 1481. The Bramble Court upheld BEPA as consti-
tutional following the court's conclusion that there was a rational basis to conclude
the extinction of the eagle would have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
See id.
125. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1991) (describing
"injury in fact" as invasion of legally protected interest that is concrete and
particularized).
126. See id.
127. 504 U.S. 555 (1991) (denying Defenders of Wildlife standing to chal-
lenge federal action abroad because its members only asserted that they might visit
foreign contested sites in the future).
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sufficient injury to grant standing. 2s Justice Scalia declared that
"the person who observes or works with a particular animal
threatened by a federal decision is facing perceptible harm, since
the very subject of his interest will no longer exist."129 In his con-
currence, Justice Stevens agreed that when the government or a pri-
vate party takes an action that negatively impacts a species or its
habitat, there is an "injury to an individual's interest in studying or
enjoying a species and its natural habitat."' 30 Justices Kennedy and
Blackmun determined that an ecosystem nexus, animal nexus, and
vocational nexus might support a claim of standing.131
Other courts, however, established limits regarding the nexus
between federal regulatory authority and interstate activities. The
Fourth Circuit, in United States v. Wilson,132 held that the application
of CWA to wetlands with no direct or indirect surface connection to
navigable waters does not substantially affect interstate com-
merce. 133 The mere possibility that intrastate waters can affect in-
terstate commerce grants the federal government too much power
and does not establish a sufficient nexus with federal authority. 34
The Supreme Court, in Solid Waste Authority of Northern Cook County
v. United States Army Corps of Engineers (SWANCC) 135 questioned
whether the use of isolated wetlands by migratory birds established
a sufficient nexus with interstate commerce to support federal au-
thority over the isolated wetlands. 13 6 In both Wilson and SWANCC,
the courts adopted too narrow a view of federal Commerce Clause
jurisdiction. Gibbs, however, is distinguishable from these cases be-
128. See id.
129. Id. at 566.
130. See id. at 582 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens disagreed with the
majority's conclusion that respondents had not suffered "injury in fact" because
they had not shown that the harm to the endangered species would produce "im-
minent" injury to the respondents. See id.
131. See id. at 579.
132. 133 F.3d 251 (4th Cir. 1997).
133. Id. at 257. The government argued jurisdiction of Clean Water Act
[hereinafter CWA] claims should be extended even without a direct or indirect
surface connection with interstate waters. See id. The defendants argued that the
district court erred in allowing the jury to find a nexus with interstate commerce
based on whether activities "could affect" interstate commerce. See id. at 255.
134. See id. at 257.
135. 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (reversing appellate court holding that Congress had
jurisdiction to regulate based upon "cumulative impact" doctrine "under which a
single activity that itself has no discernible effect on interstate commerce may still
be regulated if the aggregate effect of that class of activity has a substantial impact
on interstate commerce.") (internal citations omitted).
136. See id. at 172-73 (rejecting argument that Migratory Bird Rule falls within
congressional power to regulate and concluding Migratory Bird Rule would result
in significant infringement on states' rights).
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cause, as the Fourth Circuit noted, there is a direct connection be-
tween the taking of a red wolf and interstate commerce.
1 37
2. Biodiversity and Ecosystem Management
The Fourth Circuit, in Gibbs, accurately held that the anti-tak-
ing regulation substantially affects interstate commerce by preserv-
ing biodiversity, including the protection of scarce natural
resources.1 38 Extinction is irreversible. Conservation provides for
future interstate commerce. 139 Congress is best suited to balance
economic growth and species protection and protect the future
uses of natural resources. 14 0 Accordingly, the courts should not sec-
ond guess congressional policy decisions. 141
The anti-taking regulation helps to preserve biodiversity and
maintain ecosystems that substantially affect interstate com-
merce. 142 Biodiversity is the "total of genes, species and ecosystems
on [the] earth. ' ' 14 3 It is a "living, exploitable, renewable resource"
with "economic importance and potential consumptive and trans-
formative uses. '144 The preservation of genes is critical to many
fields of study, including the development of food and medicine
and the maintenance of the ecosystem.1 45
Genetic preservation and discoveries are important in agricul-
ture. 146 Ecological changes necessitate adaptation, requiring ge-
netic diversity. 14 7 New crop strains are essential to adapt to climate
change and to repel pests and disease. 48 For example, when the
137. Gibbs II, 214 F.3d at 493 (adopting Lopez and Morrison reasoning that "in-
dividual takings can be aggregated together for the purpose of commerce clause
analysis."). The Fourth Circuit noted that without red wolves, there would be no
related tourism, scientific study or wolf pelt business. See id. at 492. Further, the
court stated that it need not "pile inference upon inference to reach this conclu-
sion." Id. at 492-93.
138. See Gibbs II, 214 F.3d at 483 (4th Cir. 2000).
139. See id.
140. See id. at 495.
141. See id.
142. See William S. Boyd, Federal Protection of Endangered Wildlife Species, 22
STAN. L. REV. 1289, 1291 n.12 (1970).
143. Mark A. Urbanski, Chemical Prospecting Biodiversity Conservation, and the
Importance of International Protection of Intellectual Property Rights in Biological Materials,
2 BuFF. J. INT'L L. 131, 134-35 (1995).
144. See id.
145. See id. at 135 n.9.
146. See Eric Christensen, Genetic Ark: A Proposal to Preserve Genetic Diversity for
Future Generations, 40 STAN. L. REV. 279, 285-88 (1987).
147. See id.
148. See id.; see also, George Cameron Coggins & Anne Fleishel Harris, The
Greening of American Law?: Recent Evolution of Federal Law for Preserving Floral Diversity,
27 NAT. REsOURCES J. 247, 253-55 (1987) (arguing inadequacies in treaties and
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yellow dwarf virus threatened the $160 million per year barley crop,
scientists investigated 6500 varieties of barley before discovering the
Ethiopian strain, which possessed immunity. 149
Genetic discoveries assist in the development of medicines. 150
Plants are an important source for medicines. 5 1 For example, the
pacific yew provides a chemical that helps to fight cancer.152 The
bark from white willow produces salicin, an ancient version of aspi-
rin.153 The grecian foxglove supplies digoxin, a cardiac medica-
tion. 15 4 Nightshade creates atropine, an eye dilator and anti-
inflammatory.1 55 The velt bean produces L-dopa, a treatment for
Parkinson disease.' 56 The rosy periwinkle provides substances that
are effective in the treatment of Hodgkin's disease and lymphocytic
leukemia.15 7 Bacteria in a Yellowstone geyser contains a DNA
statutes limit effectiveness of plant protection and new crop strains are important
for preservation because genetic uniformity is extremely susceptible to disease).
149. SeeJ. Blanding Holman, IV, After U.S. v. Lopez: Can Clean Water Act and the
Endangered Species Act Survive Commerce Clause Attack?, 15 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 139, 209
(1995) (citing Albert Gore, EARTH IN THE BALANCE 139 (1992)) (acknowledging
importance of genetic variance in natural biodiversity to agriculture).
150. See Keith Saxe, Regulated Taking of Threatening Species Under the Endangered
Species Act, 39 HAST. L.J. 399, 407 (1988) (explaining wildlife has tremendous value
for medical research). One commentator noted:
Sea urchins have helped develop an understanding of human embryol-
ogy; a desert toad has helped in the early determination of pregnancy;
rhesus monkeys have contributed toward an understanding of human
blood groups; the antlers of deer have provided a means measuring the
degree of radioactive contamination in natural environments; studies of
animal behavior have revealed new insights into the knots and travels en-
countered by psychiatrist in their studies of the human mind.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
151. See Nagle, supra note 101, at 1208 (noting plants have yielded lifesaving
drug and possible cure for AIDS); see also Goggins and Harris, supra note 148, at
255-56 (noting that "[t]housands of plants have been used since prehistoric times
to combat illness.").
152. See Douglas 0. Heiken, The Pacific Yew and Taxol: Federal Management of an
Emerging Resource, 7J. ENVrL. L. & LITIG. 175, 185-86 (1992) (noting that extracts
from Pacific yellow yew bark have shown great promise in fighting or controlling
breast and ovarian cancers, non-small-cell lung cancer, head and neck cancer, gas-
tric cancer and malignant melanoma).
153. See Nagle, supra note 101, at 1208 n.139 (noting various species which
have proved invaluable to medicine).
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. See Patrick Parenteau, Rearranging the Deck Chairs; Endangered Species Act
Reforms in an Era of Mass Extinctions, 22 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'v REv. 227,
243 (1998) (describing rosy periwinkle, a Madagascar plant, having two alkaloids
effective in treating some childhood diseases).
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polymerase that can tolerate high temperatures and is valued at $80
million. 158
Animals, fish, amphibians, and insects also supply valuable
medicines. The venom of the pit viper contains a substance for
high blood pressure. 59 Leech saliva provides an anticoagulant. 160
Bear bile is the origin of ursodiol, a gallstone dissolver. 161 Frogs
produce antitoxins and pain killers. 162 The octopus creates a sub-
stance that relieves hypertension. 163 Insects secrete hormone-like
substances. 164 Future study will demonstrate the even greater me-
dicinal value of these animals. 165 One commentator noted that "ge-
netic resources are approximately as important to biotechnology as
iron is to steel manufacture."' 66
Plants and animals exist in an interconnected ecosystem, af-
fecting interstate commerce.' 67 The loss of one species impacts the
entire system.' 68 Disruptions in the ecosystem cause environmental
instabilities that diminish nature's ability to establish food chains,
cycle nutrients, maintain the quality of the atmosphere, control the
climate, regulate the fresh water supply, maintain the soil, dispose
of wastes, pollinate crops, and control pests and disease.' 69 For ex-
158. See Omar N. White, The Endangered Species Act's Precarious Perch: A Constitu-
tional Analysis Under the Commerce Clause and the Treaty Power, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 215,
245 (2000) (discussing bacterium known as thermus acquatis).
159. See Nagle, supra note 101, at 1208 n.141.
160. See id. at 1208 n.139, n.141.
161. See id. at 1208 n.139.
162. See id. at 1208 n.141.
163. See id.
164. See Nagle, supra note 101, at 1208 n.141.
165. See id. at 1208 (noting scientists have just begun to study most species to
learn if they possess any medical value).
166. Christensen, supra note 146, at 290.
167. See Robert Costanza et al., The Value of the World's Ecosystem Services and
Natural Capital, 387 NATURE 253 (1987) (stating "ecosystem functions refer vari-
ously to the habitat, biological or system properties or processes of ecosystems.
Ecosystem goods (such as food) and services (such as waste elimination) represent
the benefits human populations derive, directly or indirectly, from ecosystem
functions.").
168. See Saxe, supra note 150, at 408 (noting interdependence of many spe-
cies); see also Nagle, supra note 101, at 1210 (indicating that trouble to one species
generally indicates trouble to whole ecosystem); Coggins and Harris, supra note
148, at 252 (discussing that almost all species depend on green plants for survival);
George C. Coggins, Federal Wildlife Law Archives Adolescence: Developments in the
1970s, 1978 DUKE LJ. 753, 814 (1978) (discussing goal of federal wildlife laws to
preserve natural diversity); see generally Parenteau, supra note 157, at 236-44 (dis-
cussing consequences of disruption of biodiversity to ecosystem in its entirety).
169. See PAUL & ANNE EHRLICH, EXTINCriON: THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES
OF THE DISAPPEARANCE OF SPECIES 86-95 (Random House 1981) [hereinafter
EXTINCTION].
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ample, the red wolf helps to check raccoons, deer, and rabbits that
destroy farm crops. 170 The red wolf also increases bird nesting by
decreasing the raccoon population. 171
Robert Costanza estimated the value of ecosystem services in
the range of $16 to $54 trillion per year. 172 With an estimated an-
nual value of $33 trillion per year, ecosystems provide services that
cost almost twice the total gross national product of all the nations
of the world combined. a73 Costanza noted that:
[B]ecause ecosystem services are not fully 'captured' in
commercial markets or adequately quantified in terms
comparable with economic services and manufactured
capital, they are often given too little weight in policy deci-
sions. This neglect may compromise the sustainability of
humans in the biosphere. The economies of the Earth
would grind to a halt without the services of ecological life-
support systems, so in one sense their total value to the
economy is infinite. 174
Ecosystem maintenance requires a diverse gene pool.175 The
degree of complexity necessary for healthy maintenance is un-
known. 176 Paul Ehrlich equates the loss of species to the loss of
structural rivets on an airplane - a dozen might never be missed, but
the loss of the thirteenth might spell disaster. 177
Endangered and threatened species provide an early warning
that the ecosystem is in danger. Endangered and threatened spe-
cies "are the miners' canaries for the health of something larger,
which we have not yet attempted to protect in a more holistic
way.' 178 For example, the snail darter warned of the danger of
170. See Gibbs II, 214 F.3d at 495 (citing Robert J. Esher & Theodore R.
Simons, Red Wolf Propagation on Horn Island, Miss.: Red Wolf Ecological Studies
13-16 (Sept. 1993) (unpublished, Joint Appendix at 890)).
171. See id.
172. See Costanza et al., supra note 167, at 259. This attempt to calculate the
estimated value of ecological systems is one of the first. See id.
173. See id.
174. Id. at 253 (discussing importance of ecosystem services).
175. See Parenteau, supra note 157, at 238-41 (recognizing functions and value
of ecosystem).
176. See EXTINCTION, supra note 169, at xii-xiii; see also Saxe, supra note 150, at
408 (examining problems of species decline and extinction).
177. EXTINCTION, supra note 169, at xii-xiii.
178. Oliver A. Houck, Why Do We Protect Endangered Species, and What Does That
Say about Whether Restrictions on Private Property to Protect Them Constitute "Takings?',
80 IowA L. REv. 297, 301 (1995) (stating ESA is surrogate law for ecosystems); see
also Nagle, supra note 101, at 1210; Zygmunt J.B. Platter, The Embattled Social Utili-
ties of the Endangered Species Act -A Noah Presumption Against Putting Gasmasks on the
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damming rivers.' 7"1 The northern spotted owl signaled the harm to
old growth forests caused by logging. 18° The eagle demonstrated
the dangers of DDT. 18 1 The barton springs salamander indicated
that the Edwards Aquifer was being overpumped. 8 2 The Alabama
beach mouse cautioned about dune erosion. 83 Where a species is
in danger, it is likely to signal a danger to humans. 84
Human action unquestionably threatens biodiversity. 8 5 Popu-
lation expansion, pollution, rapid industrialization, and the loss of
habitats due to the demands for land and urbanization are causing
extinction. 86 The present rates of extinction are one hundred
times the natural rates; 4000 plants and 5400 animals face extinc-
tion. 187 This genetic erosion represents the irreversible loss of each
species' unique and highly valuable genetic resources. 188 ESA rec-
ognizes that these "species of fish, wildlife, and plants are of es-
thetic, ecological, educational, historical, recreational, and
scientific value to the Nation and its people." 189
Canaries in the Coalmine, 27 ENVrL. L. 845, 853-54 (1997) (indicating loss of species
serves as early warning sign).
179. See Houck, supra note 178, at 301.
180. See Nagle, supra note 101, at 1211 (providing examples to serve as early
warnings of impending danger).
181. See id.
182. See id. at 1214 n.169.
183. See id. at 1210.
184. See Parenteau, supra note 157, at 241-42.
185. See Boyd, supra note 142, at 1290 n.9. One commentator noted:
The process is governed by distinct laws of life and balance. One is adap-
tation; each species finds a precise niche in the ecosystem that supplies it
with food and shelter. At the same time, all animals have the defensive
power to multiply faster than their own death rates. As a result, predators
are required to hold the population within the limits of its food supply.
The wolf that devours the deer is a blessing to the community, if not to
the individual deer. Still another law is the necessity of diversity. The
more different species there are in an area, the less chance that any single
type of animal or plant will proliferate and dominate the community.
Even the rarest, oddest species can thus be vital to life. Variety is nature's
grand tactic of survival.
Id.
186. See Christensen, supra note 146, at 281.
187. See id.
188. See id. In a section entitled "The Extinction Crisis," Christensen analyzes
the reasons and potentially devastating effects of driving plant and animal species
to extinction. See id. Among the repercussions are irreversible loss of the world's
tropical rain forests and the many wild species that inhabit them. See id. Genetic
variability will also be lost because of the same factors leading to extinction. See id.
at 281-85.
189. 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (a) (3) (2001) (stating congressional findings and decla-
ration of purposes and policy).
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The legislative history is replete with references regarding the
necessity for protecting biodiversity. 19 1 The 1969 Senate Com-
merce Committee Report on the Endangered Species Conservation
notes,
with each species we eliminate, we reduce the pool of
germ-plasm available for use by man in future years. Since
each living species and subspecies has developed in a
unique way to adapt itself to the difficulty of living in the
world's environment, as a species is lost, its distinctive
gene material, which may subsequently prove invaluable
to mankind in improving domestic animals and increasing
resistance to disease or environmental contaminants, is
also irretrievably lost.191
The 1973 House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee Report
on ESA states,
the value of... endangered species is, quite literally, incal-
culable .... From the most narrow possible point of view,
it is in the best interests of mankind to minimize the losses
of genetic variations. The reason is simple: they are poten-
tial resources. They are keys to puzzles which we cannot
solve, and may provide answers which we have not yet
learned to ask. 192
Senator Tunney (D-Cal.), the floor leader and ESA Conference
Committee Member, noted that each species is important for sci-
ence. 193 The diversity of genetic types is necessary for thorough sci-
entific knowledge. The unknown potential of investigation into
genetic structure must remain unhindered to produce knowledge
for the benefit of man. 194
190. For a discussion of the importance of the legislative history, see William
N. Eskridge, Jr., The Aew Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621 (1990). Eskridge pro-
vides a hierarchy of legislative sources that is based on their comparative reliability.
See id. The most reliable sources are committee reports, representing the "collec-
tive understanding of these Congressmen involved in drafting and studying pro-
posed legislation." Id. (citing Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 186 (1969).
191. S. REP. No. 91-526 (1969), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 1413, 1415.
192. Endangered and Threatened Species Conservation Act of 1973, H.R.
REP. No. 93-412, at 7 (1973).
193. See Eskridge, supra note 190, at 637-38 (pointing out that statements,
made by sponsors and floor managers, who know language, intent, and purposes
of statute, are important because other members of Congress and courts rely upon
their judgment).
194. 119 CONG. REc. 25,668-70 (1973). Sen. Tunney warned that scientific
knowledge will be hindered if species are driven to extinction. See id.
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Many courts also have recognized the importance of biodivers-
ity. The Supreme Court, in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill,19 5 ac-
knowledged congressional concern regarding the undiscovered
uses of endangered species and the unforeseeable position these
creatures may have in the global chain of life. 1' " The District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, in National Association of Home
Builders v. Babbitt,'97 halted the expansion of a hospital and the
building of a road that impinged upon the habitat of the delphi fly,
an endangered species.'" 8 The court determined that the protec-
tion of biodiversity substantially affects interstate commerce.1 9"
The taking of the delphi fly, which exists only in a limited area in
California, will have genetic consequences. 2° °" Every lost species
reduces the gene pool and forecloses future commercial possibili-
ties. Biodiversity must be protected to provide for future medicines
and commercial activities. 20 1
A federal district court, in Building Industries of California v. Bab-
bitt,2 0 2 rejected a challenge to the Secretary of the Interior's listing
of the fairy shrimp, existing within the internal waters of several
western states, as an endangered species. 20 3 Building Industries al-
195. 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (holding that continuing construction of federally-
funded dam would violate ESA following Secretary's listing of species that may
have been affected by federal action). The Supreme Court interpreted Congress'
intentions for the Act to accord endangered species the highest priorities. See id.
196. See id. at 178-79 (emphasis omitted) (analyzing Congress' statements re-
garding potential resources in genetic variations and possible benefits to human
kind by minimizing losses of such variations).
197. 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
198. See id. (holding prohibition against taking of endangered fly was proper
exercise of Congress' Commerce Clause power because it regulated use of chan-
nels of interstate commerce); see also Frona M. Powell, Property Rights, Federalism,
and the Endangered Species Act, 29 REAL ESTATE L.J. 13 (2000).
199. See Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1054 (holding that taking of
endangered species would "deprive commercial actors of access to an important
natural resource-biodiversity.").
200. See id. at 1052 (citing Brief of Amici Curiae for Appellees at 20-21, Nat'l
Ass'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1052 (1997) (No. 96-5354)) (stat-
ing that 521 of 1,082 species in United States currently designated as endangered
or threatened are found in only one state).
201. See id. at 1052-54 (discussing valuable losses that would result by extinc-
tion of endangered species on interstate commerce, including loss of sources of
medicine and protection against pest control); see generally John C. Nagle, The Com-
merce Clause Meets the Delphi Sands Hlower- Loving Fly, 97 Micii. L. REv. 174 (1998) (an-
alyzing Court of Appeals for District of Columbia's opinion in National Ass'n of
Home Builders).
202. 979 F. Supp. 893, 907 (D.D.C. 1997)(holding FWS's listing of fairy
shrimp in state waters does not exceed federal Commerce Clause power because
"ESA directly and expressly regulates that import, export and sale of listed species
in interstate commerce.").
203. See id.
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leged that "there is no nexus between the fairy shrimp and inter-
state commerce and listing interferes with state and local
sovereignty over land use."2 °14 The court held that the listing did
not exceed the federal government's Commerce Clause author-
ity.2 0 5 ESA is a comprehensive federal statute that is designed to
preserve genetic material. Congress clearly recognized that species
preservation substantially affects interstate commerce. 20 6
The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Bramble, upheld BEPA,
finding that prohibition of commerce in bald eagles permits their
regeneration, which may restore their commercial value, thereby
causing businesses to profit.20 7 Any loss of the gene pool is bad
because the missing genetic information may prove invaluable to
mankind. Furthermore, each species is part of an interconnected
ecosystem. Consequently, it is rational to conclude that the extinc-
tion of the eagle will substantially affect interstate commerce. 20 8
In United States v. Romano,20 9 a federal district court upheld the
Lacey Act, prohibiting the interstate transport of fish, wildlife, rep-
tiles, mollusks, and crustaceans taken in violation of any federal,
state or foreign law.2 10 The court found that the Lacey Act's effort
to stop illegal trade preserves future commerce with the species. 2t'
It is important to preserve the gene pool. Scarce natural resources
204. Id. at 906 (stating reasons for argument that listing fairy shrimp ex-
ceeded Tenth Amendment and Congress' Commerce Clause power).
205. See id. at 907.
206. See id. (differentiating ESA from legislation at issue in Lopez and tinding
interstate commerce substantially affected).
207. 103 F.3d 1475, 1479 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding extinction of eagle would
substantially affect interstate commerce by foreclosing possibility of commercial
activity). See 16 U.S.C. § 668 (2000). The Bald Eagle Protection Act [hereinafter
BEPA] prohibits a person from taking, possessing, selling, purchasing, bartering,
offering to sell, purchase or barter, transport, export or import any American or
golden eagle. See id. This prohibition applies to eagles dead and alive, as well as
any of their parts, nests or eggs. See id. BEPA violations carry civil and/or criminal
punishment. See 16 U.S.C. § 668(a) (2000). For a discussion on the economic and
commercial consequences of eagle extinction, see supra notes 136-37 and accompa-
nying text.
208. See Bramble, 103 F.3d at 1480-82.
209. 929 F. Supp. 502 (D. Mass. 1996). In this case, the district court upheld
the constitutionality of the Lacey Act based on the aggregation principle, reason-
ing that one "unlicensed hunter, who employs the services of a guide and kills
wildlife for sport, poses little or no threat to interstate commerce; a rash of illegal
hunting, on the other hand, may well result in a reduction in wildlife-related goods
and services." Id. at 508.
210. See 16 U.S.C. § 3371(b) (1994). A person who knowingly violates the
Lacey Act may be assessed a civil penalty of $10,000 if the market value of the fish,
wildlife, or plants transported is greater than $350. See id.
211. See Romano, 929 F. Supp. at 508 (stating that Congress has continuously
perceived need to secure long-term natural resources for commercial purposes).
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have to be protected for future commercial purposes. Manufactur-
ers require a safe supply of fish, wildlife, and plants. Service indus-
tries related to hunting, study and travel all rely on a healthy
ecosystem.2 1
2
ESA is also concerned with ecosystem maintenance. The pur-
pose of ESA, which is the ultimate goal of Congress, is "to provide a
means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and
threatened species depend may be conserved." 213 Senator Tunney
declared that each species provides a service to the environment
and is part of a complex ecosystem that depends on all its compo-
nents for stability. 214 Because the value of each species is unknown,
its loss cannot be assessed. 215
Many courts have recognized the importance of ecosystem
maintenance to interstate commerce. The Fifth Circuit, in Zabel v.
Tabb,2 16 upheld the Army Corps of Engineers' refusal to issue a
dredge and fill permit for ecological reasons. 217 The Fifth Circuit
determined that the destruction of fish and wildlife have substantial
and, in some areas, devastating effects on interstate commerce. 218
Dredge and fill permits "may tend to destroy the ecological balance
and thereby affect commerce substantially." 21 9
Justice Henderson, in National Association of Home Builders v.
Babbitt,220 determined that endangered species must be preserved
in order to maintain the interconnected ecosystem. 22' If one spe-
cies is harmed, the ecosystem will be disrupted, causing interstate
212. See id.
213. 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (b) (2001). An additional purpose of this section is to
provide a program for the conservation of such endangered and threatened spe-
cies. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 1124-25
(Foundation Press 1994). The authors discuss tools used in statutory interpretation
and outline three rules to help decipher the statute's purpose, including a pre-
sumption that a statute has a reasonable purpose unless the contrary is proven. See
id. at 1125.
214. See 119 CONG. REC. 25,668 (1973) (recording debate on Endangered Spe-
cies Act of 1973).
215. See id. (categorizing trend of rapid extinction of species as "disturbing"
and calling for "urgent" need for protective legislation like ESA).
216. 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970).
217. See id. at 215 (considering House Report and National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969 together with Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act and holding
that "there is no doubt that the Secretary can refuse on conservation grounds to
grant a permit under the Rivers and Harbors Act.").
218. See id. at 203-04 (holding question as to whether destruction of fish and
wildlife has substantial effect on interstate commerce is "hardly questioned").
219. Id. at 204 (asserting that "[b ] ecause of these potential effects Congress
has the power to regulate such projects.").
220. 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
221. See id. at 1057-60.
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impacts. 22 2 Congress can regulate land use and development,
which harms the ecosystem and substantially affects interstate
commerce.
223
Opponents to the red wolf reintroduction argue that biodivers-
ity and ecosystem management cannot justify the reintroduction
because the red wolf is already extinct and is only being introduced
as a nonessential experimental population.2 24 This reasoning is
flawed. The Department of Interior designed the reintroduction of
the red wolf to restore balance to the ecosystem, enhance biodivers-
ity, and manage the ecosystem. 225 The non-essential population
designation concerns only the management of the red wolf and not
the red wolf's importance to the ecosystem. 226 A non-essential pop-
ulation designation simply means that there are other red wolves in
captive breeding programs and the released population is "not es-
sential to the continued existence of the endangered species or
threatened species."22 7
3. Prevention of Harmful Interstate Commerce
The Fourth Circuit, in Gibbs, appropriately determined that the
anti-taking regulation prevents a state from establishing any unfair
222. See id.
223. See id. (stating that loss of biodiversity has substantial effect on ecosystem
and interstate commerce).
224. See Gibbs II, 214 F.3d at 497-98.
225. For a discussion of the cumulative impact of taking the red wolves, see
supra notes 98-121 and accompanying text.
226. See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(j) (2) (B) (2001).
227. See id. Congress enacted ESA § 10(j) in 1982 to facilitate the reintroduc-
tion of endangered species by meeting the concerns of other competing economic
users. See H.R. REP. No. 97-567, at 17, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2801, 2817.
Before Congress enacted § 10(j), the Secretary of the Interior could reintroduce
an endangered species, that would, in turn, receive full ESA protection, pursuant
to a recovery plan. See id. This generated political opposition by farmers, ranch-
ers, and developers, who feared federal land-use restrictions. See id. Congress rec-
ognized that, "in order to mitigate fears expressed by industry that such
experimental populations would halt development projects," assurances had to be
"extended to prevent the creation of ESA problems." H.R. REP. No. 97-567, at 17,
reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2801, 2817. ESA § 10(j) allows the Secretary to rein-
troduce endangered species to their historic range as a nonessential experimental
population. See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(j) (2001). Specific regulations govern the ad-
ministration of the nonessential experimental population to minimize conflicts
with other economic users. See id. The nonessential experimental population is
treated as a threatened species on federal land and only as a species proposed for
listing on nonfederal land. See 16 U.S.C. §1539()(2)(C) (2001). The Secretary
can permit incidental and direct takings of the members of the nonessential exper-
imental population. See 16 U.S.C. § 1540 (2001). The red wolf was specifically
identified as an ideal candidate for the experimental population designation. See
H.R. REP. No. 567, at 34, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2834.
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competitive market advantage. 228 No state can lower its wildlife
protection standards to benefit in-state economic interests. The
federal regulation avoids a race to the bottom. 229
The anti-taking regulation is part of a larger regulatory statute
that prevents any interstate competitive market advantage. Red
wolves are taken to protect farming, ranching, and land develop-
ment.2 30 If a state fails to protect red wolves, competing economic
interests in the state will have the advantage of lower production
costs because they will not have to bear the costs due to predators.
If a state wants to attract and promote business, it will not choose to
protect red wolves. This will precipitate a race to the bottom. Con-
gress can act to prevent a state from attaining any interstate com-
petitive market advantage.2 31
Prior to the enactment of ESA, Congress recognized that state
regulation of endangered species was inadequate. 23 2 Some states
had developed programs to protect endangered wildlife, while
others failed to act because of rural pressures in the state legisla-
tures, state reliance on licensing revenues, and territorial restric-
tions. 233 Consequently, interstate controls were needed.23 4 The
legislative history of ESA demonstrates the inadequacies of then-
existing federal and state statutes as well as congressional concern
with the impact of species extinction on interstate commerce. 235
The first comprehensive legislative effort, the Endangered Spe-
cies Preservation Act of 1966 (ESPA), granted the Secretary of the
Interior authority to conserve, restore and bolster wild populations
threatened with extinction on federal lands.2 36 In addition, it au-
thorized the acquisition of endangered species habitat for inclusion
228. See Gibbs II, 214 F.3d at 501-03.
229. See id. (stating that Congress may stop "race to the bottom" in order to
prevent interstate competition whose overall effect would damage quality of na-
tional environment).
230. For a further discussion of the regulatory aspects of the anti-taking regu-
lation, see supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
231. See Donald H. Regan, How To Think About The Federal Commerce Power and
Incidentally Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REv. 554, 609-10 (1995); but see
Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race to the Bot-
tom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1210 (1992)
(challenging "race-to-the-bottom" theory).
232. See Boyd, supra note 142, at 1291.
233. See id.
234. See id. at 1291 (discussing problem of wildlife protection).
235. See id. at 1291-92, 1298-1301 (examining inadequacies of then-existing
state and federal law and discussing Commerce Clause issues).
236. See Fish and Wildlife, Conservation and Protection Endangered Species
Conservation Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 89-669, 80 Stat. 926 (1966).
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into the National Wildlife Refuge System. 237 ESPA specifically
noted that economic growth and development caused the extermi-
nation of some native species of fish and wildlife.23 8 Serious losses
of other species of native wild animals with educational, historic,
recreational and scientific value were occurring. 239 Treaties com-
mitted the United States to conserve and protect the various species
of native fish and wildlife that were threatened with extinction.2 40
While ESPA identified the causes of extinction, it focused only
on habitat protection.2 4 1 It did not protect foreign wildlife and did
not prohibit wildlife transport through interstate commerce. 24 2
Moreover, taking restrictions remained with the states.2 43 Federal
takings were only regulated in the national wildlife refuge
system. 24
4
The Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1969 (ESCA) was
enacted to address the shortcomings of ESPA.245 Congress used the
Commerce Clause to expand federal authority.2 46 ESCA authorized
the Secretary of Interior to create a list of species "threatened with
worldwide extinction" and to ban their importation into the United
States. 247 Federal authority to acquire habitat was expanded.248
The Senate Commerce Committee report recognized that species
were being exterminated at an alarming rate and that the protec-
237. See id.
238. See id.
239. See id.
240. See id. The legislation noted:
The United States has pledged itself, pursuant to migratory bird treaties
with Canada and Mexico and the Convention on Nature Protection and
Wildlife Preservation in the Western Hemisphere, to conserve and pro-
tect, where practicable, the various species of native fish and wildlife, in-
cluding game and nongame migratory birds that are threatened with
extinction.
Id.
241. See Michael E. Field, The Evolution of Wildlife Taking Concept from its Begin-
ning to its Culmination in the Endangered Species Act, 21 Hous. L. REV. 457, 474-76
(1984).
242. See id. The Secretary of Interior stated, "The bill does not authorize the
Department to control or regulate the hunting or fishing of endangered species
... on non-federal land."
243. See Boyd, supra note 142, at 1292 n.23.
244. See MICHAELJ. BEAN, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAw 194-202
(3d ed., Praeger 1997).
245. See Fish or Wildlife Endangered Species, Importation Prevention, Pub. L.
No. 91-135, 83 Stat. 275, 275-78 (1969).
246. See id.
247. See id.
248. See id. This act also gave the Secretary of the Interior the power to con-
sult with the Secretary of State to promote preservation worldwide through inter-
national agreements. See id.
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tion of endangered fish and wildlife was urgent.24 9 The interna-
tional market needed to be dried up to reduce poaching.
Outlawing the sale and purchase of any endangered species taken
in violation of national, state or foreign law provides the incentive
for ending poaching.250
ESPA and ESCA, however, afforded inadequate protection to
endangered and threatened species. New legislation was necessary
to protect threatened species; to provide a national program of en-
dangered and threatened species protection; to authorize funds for
land acquisition; and to encourage the states to provide adequate
endangered species protection. 251 On February 8, 1972, President
Richard Nixon called for additional endangered species protection
in his Environmental Message. 252 President Nixon stated that the
then-existing law failed to provide the management tools necessary
to act early enough to save vanishing species. 253
ESA, which was enacted in 1973, prohibits the taking of endan-
gered and threatened species on private land.2 54 The House
Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee Report stated that the
"protection of endangered species is not a matter that can be han-
dled in the absence of coherent national and international policies:
the result of a series of unconnected and disorganized policies and
249. See S. REP. No. 91-526 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1413-14.
Since 1600, more than 125 species of birds and mammals have become
extinct, as have nearly 100 additional subspecies (i.e., geographical races
or varieties). Today it is estimated that one or two species of birds or
mammals disappear each year. The International Union for the Conser-
vation of Nature and Natural Resources presently lists approximately 275
species of mammals and 300 birds as rare and endangered; 89 different
forms of fish and wildlife have been identified as endangered within the
United States by the Secretary of the Interior.
Id.
250. See id. The Act recognized that restricting trade would have the greatest
impact on species threatened due to their commercial value. See id. Notably, a
proposal to grant the states exclusive control over wildlife was specifically rejected
in 1969. See Boyd, supra note 142, at 1306-07 (citing Endangered Species Conserva-
tion Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-135 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 300).
The bill stated that the Nation's best interest was that "the States have the sole,
exclusive, and undisputed legal right to manage, regulate, and control fish and
wildlife in accordance with State laws and regulations notwithstanding the owner-
ship or control of the lands by the Government of the United States within the
boundaries of the respective states." Id. The Departments of Interior, Justice, and
State opposed the bill. The National Governor's Association supported the bill.
See Boyd, supra note 142, at 1306-07. Rejected proposals are important because
they show the issue was raised and defeated.
251. See S. REP. No. 93-307 (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2989, 2991.
252. See id.
253. See id. The Department of the Interior also expressed difficulties in ex-
panding the practical effects of the law to meet its stated goals. See id.
254. See 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (2001).
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programs by various states might well be confusion com-
pounded."255 Senator Tunney declared the taking provision the
most important section of the bill because it provides the most ef-
fective means to achieve the legislative purposes. 256 Senator Tun-
ney stated,
Extinction ... is a national problem necessitating involve-
ment of the Federal Government. Endangered animals
are not limited to any one area or State of the Nation so it
is impossible for the individual States to limit their move-
ment in interstate or foreign commerce. Furthermore, no
one state should be responsible for balancing its interests
against those of other States for the entire Nation. Cen-
tral authority is necessary to oversee endangered species
protection programs and to insure that local political pres-
sures do not lead to the destruction of a vital national
asset.
2 5 7
The Supreme Court, in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Rec-
lamation Association (VSMRA),258 recognized that Congress can reg-
ulate intrastate actions to eliminate dangers to interstate
commerce. 259 The Court determined that the Surface Mining and
Reclamation Control Act (SMRCA), a "comprehensive statute de-
signed to establish a nation-wide program to protect society and the
environment from the adverse effects of surface coal mining," did
not violate the Commerce Clause. 260 VSMRA alleged "[SMCRA's]
principal goal is regulating the use of private lands within the bor-
ders of the States [and] land-use regulation is within the inherent
police powers of the States and their political subdivisions." 261 The
Court, rejecting VSMRA's allegations, found the legislative record
provides ample evidence of the harmful environmental effects of
surface coal mining on interstate commerce. 262 Congress decided
that the "inadequacies in existing state laws and the need for uni-
255. Endangered and Threatened Species Conservation Act of 1973, H.R.
REP. No. 93-412, at 7 (1973) (discussing competing considerations when designing
legislation involved in protection of endangered species).
256. See 119 CONG. REc. 25,669 (1973).
257. Id.
258. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
259. Id. at 268 (citing 30 U.S.C. § 1202(a) (Supp. III 1976)).
260. See id. at 280.
261. See id. at 275 (citing Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974);
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365
(1926)).
262. See id. at 277 (citing 30 U.S.C. § 1201(c) (Supp. III 1976)).
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form minimum nationwide standards made federal regulations im-
perative." 263 According to the Court, the key is not whether the
activity is designated as local or intrastate, but whether the intra-
state activity substantially affects interstate commerce. 264 The Court
also acknowledged congressional findings:
that nationwide surface mining and reclamation standards
are essential in order to insure that competition in inter-
state commerce among sellers of coal produced in differ-
ent states will not be used to undermine the ability of the
several States to improve and maintain adequate standards
on coal mining operations within their borders. 265
This is precisely the "sort of destructive interstate competition" that
Congress can address pursuant to the Commerce Clause.
The Supreme Court, in Hodel v. Indiana,2 66 held that the prime
farmland provisions of SMRCA do not violate the Commerce
Clause. 267 The Court found that SMRCA ensures that production
of coal for interstate commerce would not come at the expense of
agriculture, the environment, or public health and safety, because
any such injury would have deleterious effects on interstate com-
merce. 268 SMRCA protects "mine operators in States adhering to
high performance and reclamation standards from disadvantageous
competition with operators in States with less rigorous regulatory
programs."269
The D.C. Circuit utilized a similar rationale in National Associa-
tion of Home Builders v. Babbitt.2 70 The Babbitt court determined that
ESA regulates economic activity that substantially affects interstate
commerce. 271 ESA, like SMRCA, regulates private intrastate non-
commercial activities to prevent actions that will harm interstate
commerce by destroying the environmental quality in other states
and the variety of species. 272 Furthermore, ESA, like SMRCA, en-
263. VMSRA, 452 U.S. at 280.
264. See S. REP. No. 93-307 (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2989, 2991.
265. VMSRA, 452 U.S. at 281-82 (citing 30 U.S.C. § 120 1(g) (Supp. Il1 976)).
266. 452 U.S. 314 (1981).
267. See id. at 330 (holding "District Court erred in concluding that the chal-
lenged provisions of the Act contravene the Tenth Amendment.").
268. See id. at 329.
269. Id. at 330. The Court stated, "The pertinent inquiry therefore is not how
much commerce is involved but whether Congress could rationally conclude that
the regulated activity affects interstate commerce." Id. at 324.
270. 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
271. See id. at 1053.
272. See id. at 1055-56.
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sures that economic growth does not undermine conservation and
species preservation, which are injurious to interstate commerce.2 73
C. The Larger Economic Regulatory Program
The Fourth Circuit, in Gibbs, correctly determined that the tak-
ing regulation is "an essential part of a larger regulation of eco-
nomic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut
unless the intrastate activity were regulated."274 ESA is a compre-
hensive statute that regulates all aspects of endangered and
threatened species. The federal government uses the best scientific
evidence to identify endangered and threatened species.2 75 Federal
action cannot jeopardize the existence of endangered or
threatened species or their critical habitat without a statutory ex-
emption. 276 Under ESA, no person can import or export such spe-
cies from the United States, take any such species within the U.S.,
including the territorial sea, or take any such species upon the high
seas. 27 7 In addition, no person can (1) possess, sell, deliver, carry,
transport, or ship, by any means whatsoever, any such species taken
in violation of the law; (2) deliver, receive, carry, transport, or ship
in interstate or foreign commerce, by any means whatsoever and in
the course of a commercial activity any such species; or (3) sell or
offer for sale in interstate or foreign commerce any such species.278
Further, the federal government must implement recovery plans in
order to conserve and promote the survival of endangered and
273. See id. at 1054-57. Judge Hendersen also focused on the economic devel-
opment that threatened the delphi fly. See id. She asserted that the economic
development itself has substantial interstate implications because the hospital and
road will be utilized by interstate travelers.
274. Gibbs II, 214 F.3d at 497 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561
(1995)).
275. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (2001).
276. See H.R. REP. No. 97-567, at 10 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2807, 2809-10. Congress amended ESA in 1976, 1978 and 1979 "to increase the
flexibility in balancing species protection and conservation with development
projects." Id. If a federal project poses a threat to an endangered species, the
Endangered Species Committee, an interagency committee known as the God
Squad, decides whether to issue an exemption for the project. See 16 U.S.C.
§ 1536. The Committee considers the costs and benefits of the project, alterna-
tives to the project, and the regional and national significance of the project. See
id.
277. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1538(a) (1) (A)-(G) (1976) (providing list of unlawful ac-
tions relating to species of fish and wildlife listed pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 1533).
278. See id.
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threatened species.2 79 Endangered and threatened species can be
reintroduced back into their historic range. 280
The taking of an endangered or threatened species is an intra-
state activity that precedes any interstate transport. There can be
no interstate transport without the prohibited taking, which also
frustrates species recovery and reintroduction. If an intrastate tak-
ing cannot be proscribed, there will be many problems.
ESA prohibits the taking of an endangered or threatened spe-
cies on federal land or in the course of federal activity.28 1 If a tak-
ing on state or private land is not proscribed, federal Commerce
Clause authority will be confined to the movement of endangered
and threatened species through interstate commerce. This harkens
back to an earlier discredited Commerce Clause rationale. In Ham-
mer v. Dagenhart,282 the Supreme Court declared the Child Labor
Act, governing the conditions of child labor, unconstitutional.283
The Court held that the mere fact that the goods produced by child
labor were intended for interstate transport does not make their
production subject to federal control because commerce is traffic,
not manufacture. 28 4 Production is subject to state, not federal, au-
thority. Congress cannot use Commerce Clause authority to regu-
late state activity. 28 5 Federal authority does not begin until goods
are transported through interstate commerce. 28 6
In United States v. Darby,287 the Supreme Court overturned
Hammer v. Dagenhart and upheld the Fair Labor Standards Act.28 8
The Court found that Congress may prohibit from interstate com-
merce, goods produced by labor not meeting federal require-
ments. 289  Under this view, there is no distinction between
279. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(e)(1) (2001)(referring to Secretary's duty to de-
velop and implement recovery plans unless it is determined that such plans will
not promote conservation of affected species).
280. See 16 U.S.C. § 1539 (2001).
281. See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a) (1) (B) (2000).
282. 247 U.S. 251, 276 (1918), overruled by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100
(1941).
283. See id. (finding that production is separate from traffic of commerce and
therefore is not subject to federal Commerce Clause authority).
284. See id. at 272-76.
285. See id. (noting Congress cannot use Commerce Clause authority to regu-
late state activity).
286. See id.
287. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
288. See id. at 117 (finding that Congress can prohibit goods produced by
labor not meeting federal requirements of interstate commerce).
289. See id.
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production and commerce.290 The Court stated that the "motive
and purpose of a regulation of interstate commerce are matters for
the legislative judgment upon the exercise of which the Constitu-
tion places no restriction and over which the Courts are given no
control."29 1 The Court held that Congress can regulate intrastate
activity that affects interstate commerce or the exercise of the
power of Congress over it.29 2 Congress can protect interstate com-
merce from goods produced under substandard labor conditions
and prevent any state from gaining any advantage in interstate mar-
kets by allowing such production. 29 3
Since the anti-taking regulation is part of a larger economic
regulatory program, the effect on commerce must be viewed from
the cumulative impact of such takings, not the taking of one
wolf.2 94 The Court, in Lopez, stated that "where a general regulatory
statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimis
character of individual instances arising under that statute is of no
consequence. 295
Judge Luttig's dissent, in Gibbs, asserted that the taking of forty-
one red wolves on private property cannot substantially impact in-
terstate commerce because of its limited scope.296 The dissent,
however, failed to appreciate ESA's purpose. When a species is des-
ignated endangered or threatened, only a limited number of the
species remain. The fewer the number, the greater the need for
congressional action. The Fourth Circuit, in Gibbs, declared that "it
would be perverse indeed if a species nearing extinction were
290. See id.
291. Id. at 115 (stating that regardless of their motive, regulations of com-
merce not explicitly prohibited by Constitution are within Congress' plenary
power).
292. See Darby, 312 U.S. at 118 (explaining that Congress' power over inter-
state commerce is not confined to regulation of commerce among the states).
293. See id. at 122-24 (discussing ultimate aim of legislation is suppression of
activities that restrain trade and result in unfair competition).
294. See Gibbs II, 214 F.3d at 497 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
561 (1995)). "A single red wolf taking may be insubstantial by some measures but
that does not invalidate a regulation that is part of the ESA and seeks conservation
not only of any single animal but also the recovery of the species as a whole." Id. at
498.
295. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995); see also Perez v. United
States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971) (noting "where the class of activities is regulated
and that class is within the reach of federal power, the courts have no power to
excise, as trivial, individual instances of the class.").
296. See Gibbs II, 214 F.3d at 508-09 (Luttig, J., dissenting) (arguing small tak-
ing has no economic impact or character now or in foreseeable future).
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found to be beyond Congress' power to protect while abundant
species were subject to full federal regulatory power." 297
1. Jurisdiction
The Court, in Lopez, was concerned that federal regulatory stat-
utes delineated jurisdictional boundaries between federal and state
government authority.298 In Gibbs, the Fourth Circuit appropriately
held that the anti-taking regulation possesses jurisdictional parame-
ters.299 Specifically, the regulation does not apply to all wildlife and
plants, but only to endangered and threatened species. 300
Section four- of ESA permits the Secretary of the Interior to
determine whether a species is endangered or threatened because
of "(A) the present or threatened destruction, modification, or cur-
tailment of its habitat or range; (B) overutilization for commercial,
recreational, scientific, or educational purposes; (C) disease or pre-
dation; (D) the inadequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms; or
(E) other natural or manmade factors affecting its continued exis-
tence."30 1 This determination rests solely on the basis of the best
scientific and commercial data available.30 2 The Secretary pub-
lishes a list of all endangered and threatened species. 30 3 Once
every five years the Secretary reviews the status of each species on
the list.30 4 If the Secretary removes a species from the list, authority
over the species is returned to the states.30 5
297. Gibbs II, 214 F.3d at 498 (rejecting view that endangered species lie be-
yond Congressional protection because there are too few animals left to make
commercial difference).
298. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564 (discussing Congress' authority under legisla-
tion to regulate not only all violent crime, but all activities that might lead to vio-
lent crime).
299. See Gibbs II, 214 F.3d at 503-04 (distinguishing federal government's re-
sponsibility for protection of red wolves from its responsibility for guns in school
zone).
300. See id.
301. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1) (2001).
302. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A) (2000).
303. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a) (2) (A) (2000).
304. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(c) (1982). The Secretary, after reviewing the status
of a listed species, may remove the species from the list, change its status from
endangered to threatened or threatened to endangered, or leave its status un-
changed. See id.
305. See U.S. CONST. amend. X (reserving to states or people those powers not
delegated to United States).
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2. Federalism
The Lopez Court stressed that there must be a distinction be-
tween what is truly national and what is truly local.30 6 Federal regu-
lation must not impinge on an "area of traditional state concern,"
to which "States lay claim by right of history and expertise."3 0 7 The
Fourth Circuit, in Gibbs, acknowledged that it "must particularly
scrutinize regulatory activity that falls within an area of the law
where States historically have been sovereign and countenance of
the asserted federal power would blur the boundaries between the
spheres of federal and state authority."308 The Gibbs court correctly
concluded that the states play an important role in regulating wild-
life, but found that state control is circumscribed by federal regula-
tory authority.3 0 9
State control over wildlife has long been acknowledged. Origi-
nally, state authority was based on the theory that the state owned
the wildlife within its border. This precluded state regulation of
wildlife from dormant Commerce Clause authority. The state own-
ership theory began with Geer v. Connecticut3 10 in 1896 and ended
with Hughes v. Oklahoma31 1 in 1979. During the same period and
thereafter, the federal government regulated wildlife pursuant to
the Commerce Clause, treaty power, and Property Clause.3 12 Fed-
eral regulation was consistently upheld by the courts. The more
accurate view is that states regulate wildlife, unless preempted by
federal authority. The Court declared that, "[a] lthough states have
important interests in regulating wildlife and natural resources
306. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995) (declining to expand
congressional authority over truly local activity, possession of gun in school zone).
307. Id. at 580, 583 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
308. Gibbs II, 214 F.3d at 499 (citing Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst.
and State Univ., 169 F.3d 820, 837 (4th Cir. 1999) (suggesting value of impartial
court analysis when federal regulation infringes on traditional role of state)).
309. See id. at 499-502 (citing Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896))
(describing prolonged erosion of Geer decision and its ultimate reversal). The
Gibbs II court explained that, even post-Lopez, Congress is authorized to regulate
private land use for wildlife conservation and concluded that endangered wildlife
regulation has not been an exclusive or primary state function.
310. 161 U.S. 619 (1896).
311. 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
312. See Boyd, supra note 142, at 1289; see also The Evolution of Wildlife Legisla-
tion in the U.S.: An Analysis of the Legal Efforts to Protect Endangered Species and its
Prospects for the Future, 5 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 441 (1993); George Cameron
Coggins and William H. Hensley, Constitutional Limits on Federal Power to Protect and
Manage Wildlife: Is the Endangered Species Act Endangered?, 61 IOWA L. REv. 1099
(1976); Byron Swift, Endangered Species Act: Constitutional Tensions and Regulatory Dis-
cord, 4 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 97, 105-13 (1977); George Cameron Coggins, Wildlife
and the Constitution: The Walls Come Tumbling Down, 55 WASH. L. REv. 295 (1980).
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within their borders, this authority is shared by the Federal Govern-
ment when the Federal Government exercises one of its enumer-
ated powers." 31
3
a. Dormant Commerce Clause
The Commerce Clause has both positive and negative attrib-
utes. Negative or dormant Commerce Clause authority precludes
state regulation that discriminates against interstate commerce. 314
In 1896, the Supreme Court, in Geer v. Connecticut,31 5 upheld a state
statute that prohibited the export of game birds.31 6 The Court de-
clared that the state can "control and regulate the common prop-
erty in game" because the state holds such a right in "trust for the
benefit of the people."3 17 In light of the state's ownership "it may
well be doubted whether commerce is created" by the killing and
subsequent sale of the game.3 8 However, state power extends only
as far as its exercise is not incompatible with, or restrained by, the
313. Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999).
314. See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. 456, 472 (1981). A
court must decide if the statute incidentally burdens interstate commerce or ex-
plicitly discriminates against interstate commerce. See id. A statute that regulates
evenhandedly and only incidentally burdens commerce is generally upheld if the
burden imposed on interstate trade is not excessive in relation to its putative bene-
fits. See id. A statute that explicitly or effectively discriminates against interstate
commerce is presumed to be invalid and is subject to strictjudicial scrutiny. See id.;
see also City of Philadelphia v. NewJersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978); see generally Edward
A. Fitzgerald, The Constitutional Division of Powers with Respect to the Environment in the
United States, in FEDERALISM AND THE ENVIRONMENT: ENVIRONMENTAL POLICYMAKING
IN AUSTRALIA, CANADA, AND THE UNITED STATES, at 1-36 (Kenneth Holland, F.L.
Morton, Brian Galligan, eds., 1996).
315. 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
316. Id. at 533-35. The Supreme Court, in Geer, based its rationale, in part,
on idea that there is
fundamental distinction between the qualified ownership in game and
the perfect nature of ownership in other property .... [Thus, State has
authority] over property in game killed within its confines, [as well as]
consequent power . .. to follow such property into whatever hands it
might pass with the conditions and restrictions deemed necessary for the
public interest.
Id.
317. Id. at 534 (noting that "right to preserve game flows from the undoubted
existence in the State of a police power to that end, which may be none the less
efficiently called into play, because by doing so interstate commerce may be re-
motely and indirectly affected.").
318. Id. at 530 (explaining that even if sale of game does create commerce, "it
does not follow that such internal commerce became necessarily the subject-matter
of interstate commerce, and therefore under the control of the Constitution of the
United States. The distinction between internal and external commerce and inter-
state commerce is marked, and has always been recognized by this court.").
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Constitutional rights conveyed to the federal government.3 19 The
Geer decision established the state ownership theory, exempting
state wildlife regulation from dormant Commerce Clause authority.
Twelve years later, the federal government brought suit against
a vessel for taking sponges in the Gulf of Mexico and utilizing div-
ing apparatus that violated a federal statute. 320 The Supreme
Court, in The Abby Dodge v. United States,321 upheld the validity of the
federal statute that was restricted to waters outside of state territo-
rial waters.32 2 The Court noted that state ownership of the sponges
precluded the application of the federal statute in state waters. 323
This, however, was the last time that the Geer decision was cited as
authority. 324
The Court first criticized Geer in Missouri v. Holland325 in
1920.326 The Court stated that:
[n] o doubt it is true that as between a state and its inhabi-
tants the State may regulate the killing and sale of such
birds, but it does not follow that its authority is exclusive of
paramount powers. To put the claim of the State upon
title is to lean upon a slender reed. Wild birds are not in
the possession of anyone; and possession is the beginning
of ownership.3 27
319. See id. at 528 (deferring ostensibly to federal government to extent state
authority conflicts with enumerated powers of federal government).
320. See The Abby Dodge v. United States, 223 U.S. 166 (1912).
321. See id.
322. See id.
The people of the United States, as distinguished from the people of the
several States, have no common property in wild animals, oysters, fish,
etc., within the boundaries of the several States, which will give them as
citizens of the United States the right to legislate for the preservation of
such property within the limits of the several States. The right to legislate
on this subject being based upon the common ownership of the property,
the several States have this authority when they are erected; but neither
the States nor the United States have this authority over the waters of the
high seas outside the limits of the several States.
Id.
323. See id. at 175.
324. See Coggins, supra note 312, at 295.
325. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
326. See id. (holding that government could constitutionally regulate killing
of migratory birds and still comport with valid treaty).
327. Id. at 434-35 (concluding "it is not sufficient to rely upon the States" to
protect a national interest of very nearly the first magnitude by stating "[t]he reli-
ance is vain.").
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In 1928, the Court examined Geer in Foster-Fountain Packing Co.
v. Haydel,328 striking down a Louisiana statute that required shrimp
harvested in Louisiana waters to be processed in Louisiana.3 29 The
Court held that Louisiana was not attempting to keep the shrimp
for domestic consumption so "as to such shrimp the protection of
the Commerce Clause attaches at the time of taking."330 The initial
taking "puts an end to the trust upon which the State is deemed to
own or control the shrimp for the benefit of its people."33 1
The state ownership theory continued to disintegrate in two
Supreme Court cases decided in 1948. In Toomer v. Witsell,3 32 the
Court struck down a South Carolina statute that charged out-of-
state commercial shrimp harvesters licensing fees one hundred
times those of residents as a violation of the Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause.333 The Court declared state ownership a "fiction" em-
ployed in the past to allow a state to regulate the exploitation of
wildlife within its borders.334 In Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commis-
sion,33 5 the Court invalidated a state statute that denied a fishing
license to any person not eligible to be a citizen of the United
States.3 36 The Court noted:
[t]o whatever extent the fish in the three-mile belt may be
'capable of ownership' by California, we think that 'owner-
ship' is inadequate to justify California in excluding any
and all aliens who are lawful residents of the state from
making a living in fishing in the ocean off its shores while
permitting all others to do so. 337
Both cases rejected the state ownership claims and precluded state
regulations that violated the Constitution.3 38
328. 278 U.S. 1 (1928).
329. See id. (ruling in opposition to Geer and suggesting that state ownership
as expansive right should be reconsidered).
330. Id. at 13 (noting that shrimp were caught for transportation and sale in
interstate commerce in direct opposition to conservation for intrastate use).
331. Id. (moving further from Geerby noting that state does not have absolute
ownership over state game, but operates in its sovereign capacity as representative
of people).
332. 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
333. See id. at 396 (finding South Carolina statute "plainly and frankly" dis-
criminates against non-residents).
334. See id. at 402.
335. 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
336. See id. at 420-22.
337. Id. at 421.
338. See Coggins, supra note 312, at 316-18; see also Boyd, supra note 142, at
1304 (noting state ownership claims violate Constitution).
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In 1977, the Supreme Court, in Douglas v. Seacoast Products,
Inc.,339 struck down a Virginia statute that denied commercial fish
licenses to aliens and restricted the rights of nonresidents to fish.340
The Court noted that, "[a] t earlier times in our history there was
some doubt whether Congress had power under the Commerce
Clause to regulate the taking of fish in state waters; there can be no
question today that such power exists where there is some effect on
interstate commerce."3 41 Federal Commerce Clause authority was
based on "the movement of vessels from one state to another in
search of fish, and back again to processing plants .... "342 The
Court rejected state ownership as a legal fiction and concluded that
the question under modem analysis is whether the State's exercise
of its police power is in conformity with the federal laws and the
Constitution.3 4 3
The Supreme Court finally overturned Geer in 1979 in Hughes
v. Oklahoma.344 The Hughes Court invalidated an Oklahoma statute,
prohibiting the export of natural minnows and declaring the Geer
analysis eroded "to the point of virtual extinction in cases involving
regulation of wild animals. '345 Wildlife legislation must be evalu-
ated according to the same principles applied to state regulations of
other natural resources.3 46 Nevertheless, the Court acknowledged
that there are legitimate state concerns for conservation and pro-
tection of wild animals underlying the 19th century theory of state
ownership.3 47  Hughes ended the state ownership theory and
brought state wildlife regulation within Commerce Clause
restrictions.3 48
b. Commerce Clause
The Commerce Clause grants a positive authority to the fed-
eral government that has been used to support federal wildlife reg-
339. 431 U.S. 265 (1977).
340. See id. (holding Virginia statutes were preempted by Federal Enrollment
and Licensing Act and were invalid under Supremacy Clause).
341. Id. at 281-82 (stating extent of Commerce Clause power to regulate fish-
ing in state waters).
342. See id.
343. See id. at 284-85; see also Coggins, supra note 312, at 317.
344. 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
345. Id. at 331 (demonstrating Geer analysis as inadequate).
346. See id. at 335 (showing wildlife legislation is no different than regulation
of other natural resources).
347. See id. at 335-36 (acknowledging state concerns of wild animals).
348. See Coggins, supra note 312, at 318-21.
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ulation in the face of inadequate state control.3 49 The Lacey Act of
1900, as the first exercise of federal Commerce Clause authority
precluded any wildlife killed in violation of federal, state, or foreign
law from interstate commerce. 350  Congress initially aimed the
Lacey Act at "pot hunters," who killed large amounts of wildlife for
sale, and the importation of game unlawfully killed in another
state . 51 Congress amended the Act in 1935 to prohibit the trans-
portation of animals taken in violation of federal and foreign
laws. 352 Congress recognized "the inability of individual states to
protect wildlife resources against well organized commercial inter-
ests able to harvest excessive quantities of wildlife and promptly
ship them in interstate commerce out of the reach of the state
where they were harvested. ' 353 The Lacey Act has been upheld as a
valid exercise of federal commerce power.3 54
The Bald Eagle Protection Act of 1940 (BEPA), which was
amended in 1962 to include golden eagles, is designed to protect
eagles from extinction. 355 The Act prohibits all commerce in eagles
or eagle parts, including the taking, possession, sale, purchase, bar-
ter, transportation, exportation or importation of bald or golden
eagles or their parts.35 6 Courts have found that the commerce in
and the possession of eagle parts, taken as a class, substantially af-
fect interstate commerce because both activities, even when con-
ducted wholly intrastate, threaten the eagle with extinction.3 57 The
349. See id. at 313 (suggesting Commerce Clause is valuable tool for wildlife
regulation).
350. See Field, supra note 241, at 468-69 (noting first significant federal wild-
life legislation began at beginning of 20"' century); see also Robert S. Anderson, The
Lacey Act: America's Premier Weapon in the Fight Against Unlawful Wildlife Trafficking,
16 PUB. LAND L. REv. 27, 85 (1995). One commentator noted that the Lacey Act
"is arguably our nation's most effective tool in the fight against an illegal wildlife
trade whose size, profitability, and threat to global diversity Lacey could probably
not have imagined." Id.
351. See S. RP. No. 97-123, at 1 (1981), reprinted in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1748,
1749.
352. See DAVINA KARl KAILE, EVOLUTION OF WILDLIFE LEGISLATION IN THE
UNITED STATES: AN ANALYSIS OF THE LEGAL EFFORTS TO PROTECT ENDANGERED SPE-
CIES AND PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE, 441, 446-48 (1993) (noting expansion of
Lacey Act to include more prohibition of animal transportation in violation of
foreign law).
353. Id. at 447.
354. See, e.g. United States v. Bryant, 716 F.2d 1091 (6th Cir. 1983); United
States v. Power, 923 F.2d 131 (9th Cir. 1990).
355. 16 U.S.C. § 668 (2001).
356. See id.
357. See Coggins, supra note 312, at 310-11; see, e.g., Rupert v. United States,
181 F. 87 (8th Cir. 1910); Eager v. Jonesboro, Lake City & Express Co., 147 S.W.
60, 60-61 (Ark. 1912).
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Supreme Court, in Andrus v. Allard,358 found it reasonable for Con-
gress to conclude that the potential for commercial gain poses a
"special threat to the preservation of the eagles because that pros-
pect creates a powerful incentive both to evade statutory prohibi-
tions against taking birds and to take a large volume of birds. 3 5 9
Further, the Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Bramble, determined
that Congress had a rational basis to conclude that the extinction of
the eagle would have a substantial effect on interstate commerce
and the means necessary to accomplish this were rationally related
to the ends.3 60
The Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 (MMPA) recog-
nized that certain species of marine mammals are in danger of ex-
tinction because of human activity.36 1 The Act established a
moratorium on the taking and importation of marine mammals
and any products made from them.36 2 State law is preempted and
takings are broadly defined.3 63 MMPA states:
Marine mammals ... either (A) move in interstate com-
merce, or (B) affect the balance of marine ecosystems in a
manner which is important to other animals and animal
products which move in interstate commerce, and that the
protection and conservation of marine mammals and
their habitats is therefore necessary to insure the continu-
ing availability of those products which move in interstate
commerce.
364
Congress specifically acknowledged the value of ecosystem manage-
ment, warning that marine mammal populations cannot be allowed
to "diminish beyond that point at which they cease to be a signifi-
cant functioning element in the ecosystem of which they are a
part. ' 365 Furthermore, the focus of their management "should be
358. 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
359. Id. at 58 (showing commerce presents special threats to eagles).
360. See United States v. Bramble, 103 F.3d 1475, 1482 (determining eagle ex-
tinction would have substantial impact on interstate commerce).
361. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1421 (2000); see also Field, supra note 229, at 473-74
(defining Marine Mammal Protection Act [hereinafter MMPA]).
362. See 16 U.S.C. § 1371 (2000).
363. See 16 U.S.C. § 1362(13) (2000)(defining taking to mean "to harass,
hunt, capture or kill, or attempt to harass, hunt, capture or kill any marine
mammal.").
364. 16 U.S.C. § 1361(5) (1994)(stating congressional findings for MMPA).
365. Id.
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to maintaining the health and stability of the marine ecosystem." 366
Lawsuits challenging MMPA generally have been unsuccessful.
3 67
c. Treaty Power
The federal government can regulate wildlife pursuant to a
treaty. 368 The Constitution grants the President the power to make
treaties "by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate."3 69 The
treaty and its implementing legislation become "the Supreme Law
of the Land. '370 In 1916, the United States and Great Britain
signed a convention to protect migratory birds in the United States
and Canada, which was implemented in 1918 by the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act (MBTA).371 The Supreme Court upheld MBTA, in Mis-
souri v. Holland,3 72 as legislation necessary and proper to implement
the treaty.3 73 Federal treaty-making authority was not limited by
any "invisible radiation from the general terms of the Tenth
Amendment."374
Further, in 1973, the United States signed the Convention on
the International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora, requiring signatory nations to prevent any trade in endan-
gered species.375 Congress enacted ESA in part to implement the
treaty.376
366. See 16 U.S.C. § 1361(5) (Supp. V 1975) (stating MMPA goals).
367. See, e.g., Globe Fur Dyeing Corp. v. United States, 467 F. Supp. 177
(1978) (holding MMPA does not violate guarantees of either due process or equal
protection); see also Coggins, supra note 312, at 311 (noting lawsuits challenging
MMPA's validity have been unsuccessful).
368. See Coggins, supra note 312, at 326-27 (discussing treaty power support-
ing federal wildlife statutes); see also Boyd, supra note 142, at 1293-95 (stating use of
treaty power was valid under Supremacy Clause); Coggins & Hensley, supra note
312, at 1122-25 (noting validity of statutes implementing treaties, but acknowledg-
ing limitations of treaty power); Saxe, supra note 150, at 469-71 (discussing regula-
tion of migratory birds by implementation of treaty in Migratory Bird Act of 1918).
369. U.S. CoNST. art. II, § 2 (defining President's power to make treaties pro-
vided that two thirds of Senators present concur).
370. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, § 1 (stating Supremacy Clause).
371. See United States v. McCullagh, 221 F. 288, 292 (D. Kan. 1915) (finding
that states hold power of control over game and holding that power is not dictated
by Commerce Clause authority); see also United States v. Shauver, 214 F. 154, 154
(E.D. Ark. 1914) (holding states, not federal government own game).
372. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
373. See id. (upholding statute implementing Migratory Bird Treaty).
374. Id. at 434.
375. Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora, 12 I.L.M. 1085 (Mar. 3, 1973) [hereinafter CITES].
376. See 16 U.S.C. § 1531(4) (2000)(stating "the United States has pledged
itself as a sovereign state in the international community to conserve to the extent
practicable the various species of fish or wildlife and plants facing extinction pur-
suant to ... the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
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d. Property Clause
The federal government can also regulate wildlife pursuant to
the Property Clause, granting Congress the "[p] ower to dispose of
and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the territory
or other property belonging to the United States." 377 Congress pos-
sesses a plenary power over federal lands that overrides any incon-
sistent state authority.3 78 Congress can protect and conserve
wildlife that is physically present on federal land and prevent activi-
ties on private land that threaten public land. 379 The Court, in
Camfield v. United States,38 0 upheld a federal statute precluding the
enclosure of public lands by fences built on private land authorized
by state law. 38 ' Further, in United States v. Alford,38 2 the Court deter-
mined that the federal government could prohibit the setting of a
fire on private land that potentially endangers the federal forest.38 3
In 1975, the Supreme Court reaffirmed Camfield and Alford in
Kleppe v. New Mexico.38 4 At the request of a federal lessee, authori-
ties in New Mexico removed wild burros from federal lands and
Fauna and Flora."); see also Coggins, supra note 312, at 326-27 (noting that Con-
gress recognized CITES and other treaties as agreements that ESA was designed to
implement); Anderson, supra note 330, at 35 (discussing ESA implementation of
CITES to prohibit improper trade in species protected under treaty).
377. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3 (mandating Congress' power to regulate land).
378. See id.
379. See Boyd, supra note 142, at 1295-98 (explaining Congress' territorial
power); see also Coggins, supra note 312, at 324-25 (discussing ways property power
authorizes regulation of wildlife not on federal lands); Coggins & Hensley, supra
note 312, at 1135-43 (noting federal power over wildlife on federal, state, and pri-
vate land); Eugene R. Gaetke, The Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness Act of 1978:
Regulating Nonfederal Property Under the Property Clause, 60 OR. L. REv. 157, 166-74
(1981) (discussing regulation of nonfederal property); Ronald F. Frank & John H.
Eckhard, Power of Congress Under the Property Clause to Give Extraterritorial Effect to
Federal Lands Law: Will 'Respecting Property' Go the Way of Affecting Commerce?, 15 NAT.
RESOURCES LAw. 663 (1983); Louis Touton, The Property Power, Federalism, and the
Equal Footing Doctrine, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 817, 820-23 (1980) (noting sources in Con-
stitution that provide Congress with power over federal property).
380. 167 U.S. 518 (1897).
381. Id. at 528 (holding Congress exercised its constitutional right of protect-
ing public lands from nuisances from adjoining property).
382. 274 U.S. 264 (1927).
383. Id. at 265 (holding Congress may prohibit acts on privately owned lands
that endanger publicly owned forests).
384. 426 U.S. 529 (1976) (holding Congress did not exceed its Constitutional
authority aimed at protecting wild horses and burros); see also Mary Elizabeth
Plumb, Expansion of National Power Under the Property Clause: Federal Regulation of
Wildlife, 12 LAND & WATER L. REv. 181 (1977) (noting Supreme Court's expansion
of national power under property clause in Kleppe); Linda Williams, Constitutionality
of the Free Range Wild Horses and Burros Act, 7 ENVTL. L. 137, 13940 (1976) (discuss-
ing sovereign rights for environmental control).
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sold them.3 5 The United States Bureau of Land Management de-
manded compensation pursuant to the Wild Free-Roaming Horses
and Burros Act (WFRHBA), which protects unbranded and un-
claimed horses on public lands as "living symbols of the historic and
pioneer spirit of the West. ' 386 The animals are considered an inte-
gral part of the natural system of public lands and the Act directs
the Secretaries of Interior and Agriculture to protect and manage
them as components of public lands.3 8 7 New Mexico brought suit,
challenging the constitutionality of WFRHBA. 38 The Supreme
Court upheld the Act, stating that the "furthest reaches of [the]
Property Clause have not yet been definitively resolved," but the
power "necessarily included the power to regulate and protect the
wildlife living there."389
An alternative argument to restrict the taking of the red wolf
exists pursuant to the Property Clause. The reintroduced red
wolves were born in federal captive breeding programs and re-
leased on federal land. The red wolves can be considered federal
property. The Supreme Court has recognized that the federal gov-
ernment can regulate activities on private land that affect federal
property.
e. Traditional State Authority
Prior to Lopez, the Supreme Court attempted to identify tradi-
tional state functions that were immune from federal regulation.
This effort began in National League of Cities, et al. v. User, 390 but was
abandoned in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority39 1
because the Court was unable to articulate any basis for such a dis-
tinction. 3 92 The Court resurrected this issue in Lopez, but provided
no principled basis for establishing enclaves of state authority free
from federal intrusion.
385. See Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 535.
386. See id. at 535-36 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1331 (Supp. IV 1970)).
387. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340; see also Coggins & Hensley, supra note 312, at
1100-05 (discussing Wild and Free-Roaming Horses Act of 1971).
388. See Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 529.
389. Id. at 541.
390. 426 U.S. 833, 855 (1976) (holding Congress may not exercise power over
states choices as to how to conduct "traditional governmental functions").
391. 469 U.S. 528, 529 (1985) (overruling National League of Cities, et al. v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)).
392. See id. at 546-47 (rejecting as unsound and unworkable rule of state im-
munity from federal regulation that turns on judicial appraisal of whether particu-
lar governmental function is "integral" or "traditional").
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The scope of Congress' Commerce Clause authority has varied
throughout United States' history. Initially, the Supreme Court,
under Justice Marshall, established broad and expansive federal
commerce authority.393 From 1833 to 1937, the Court fostered
dual federalism, restricting federal commerce power when it inter-
fered with the states' Tenth Amendment authority.3 94 Following
President Roosevelt's unsuccessful attempt to pack the Court in
1937, the Court accepted almost unlimited congressional Com-
merce Clause authority and promoted cooperative federalism.3 95
From 1937 to 1976, the Court upheld all federal legislation enacted
pursuant to the Commerce Clause. Several commentators were
critical of the Court's retreat.396 Professor Paul Freund argued that
the courts still had an important role to play in protecting state
sovereignty. 397 Professor Edward Corwin noted that "today the
question faces us whether the constituent States of the system can
be saved for any useful purpose, and thereby saved as the vital cells
that they have been heretofore of democratic sentiment, impulse
and action." 39 8 Professor Herbert Wechsler responded that aggres-
sive judicial action to protect states' rights is not necessary because
there are inherent political safeguards to protect federalism. 399
393. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) (asserting supremacy of act of
Congress regulating navigation of United States' waters).
394. See United States v. E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (holding indirect af-
fect on commerce insufficient to allow regulation); see also Hammer v. Dagenhardt,
247 U.S. 251 (1918) (prohibiting Congress from exercising police power over
states); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (forbidding application of
commerce power to local industries); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (upholding attempted regulation of intrastate transac-
tions that only affected interstate commerce indirectly).
395. See NLRB v. Jones Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (ruling intra-
state activities closely connected to interstate commerce subject to congressional
regulation); see also United States v. Caroline Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938)
(upholding prohibition of interstate shipments of particular products); United
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (allowing restriction on interstate shipments
based on violation of wage standard for manufacturing employees).
396. See Paul A. Freund, Umpiring the Federal System, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 561
(1954) (arguing state interests in regulating commerce); see also Larry D. Kramer,
Putting the Politics Back Into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REv.
at 216-17 (criticizing Supreme Court's aggressive federalism); Edward S. Corwin,
The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REv. 1 (1950).
397. See Freund, supra note 396, at 561 (noting that many areas may still be
protected).
398. See Corwin, supra note 36, at 2-4.
399. See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REv.
543 (1954).
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In 1976, the Supreme Court, in National League of Cities et al. v.
Useyy,40 0 attempted to revive dual federalism, declaring unconstitu-
tional the 1974 amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA), which extended minimum wage and maximum hour provi-
sions to state and local government employees. 40 1 The Court held
that the power to establish wages and working hours for state em-
ployees is "an undoubted attribute of state sovereignty" protected
by the Tenth Amendment. The Court, however, noted that federal
power over the states is not as great as that over private actions pur-
suant to the Commerce Clause.40 2 Justice Blackmun, in his concur-
rence, cautioned that the Court did "not outlaw federal power in
areas such as environmental protection, where the federal interest
is demonstrably greater and where state facility compliance with im-
posed federal standards would be essential." 403
In 1981, the impact of National League of Cities on environmen-
tal legislation was examined in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and
Reclamation Association.40 4 The Hodel Court upheld SMRCA and
stated that the Tenth Amendment does not limit Congress' Com-
merce Clause authority to preempt or displace state regulation of
private activity. 40 5 The Court must "defer to a congressional find-
ing that a regulated activity affects interstate commerce, if there is
any rational basis for such a finding. '40 6 Once this is established, a
court's only inquiry is whether the means chosen by Congress are
"reasonably adapted to the end permitted by the Constitution. '40 7
The Court stressed that the states are in a different position when
400. 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (forbidding Congress from imposing upon states'
decisions as to integral governmental functions); see generally, Byron Swift, Endan-
gered Species Act: Constitutional Tensions and Regulatory Discord, 4 COLUM. J. ENVL. L.
97, 105-13 (1977) (noting problems with broad federal powers).
401. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 537 (1985).
The Court identified four conditions for invalidating federal regulation of state
activities pursuant to the Commerce Clause. See id. First, the federal statute at
issue must regulate "the States as States." Id. Second, the federal statute must
"address matters that are indisputably attributes of state sovereignty." Id. Third,
state compliance with the federal statute must "directly impair [the States'] ability
'to structure integral operation in areas of traditional governmental functions.'"
Id. Finally, the federal interest does not justify state submission. See id.
402. Usery, 426 U.S. at 842 (defining state powers).
403. Id. at 856 (outlining federal areas of interest).
404. 452 U.S. 264 (1981)(allowing regulation of goods moving in interstate
commerce).
405. See id.
406. Id. at 276 (setting out analytical framework for Commerce Clause issues).
407. Id.
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challenging the exercise of Congress' power to regulate commerce
than an individual or corporation. 408
In 1985, the Court overturned National League of Cities in Garcia
v. San Antonio and resurrected the political safeguards of federal-
ism. 40 9 The Court was unable to rely on a historical or functional
analysis to identify core state governmental functions that were im-
mune from federal regulation.410 Consequently, the Court rejected
"as unsound in principle and unworkable in practice, a rule of state
immunity from federal regulation that turns on a judicial appraisal
of whether a particular governmental function is 'integral' or 'tradi-
tional.'- 41' The Court declared that the states must rely on the po-
litical process to prevent Congress from intruding on state
sovereignty. 412
In the 1990s, the Supreme Court revived federalism and re-
jected political safeguards to protect federalism. 413 The Court is
seeking to protect the states from Congress by establishing enclaves
of state authority immune from federal regulation. 414 This aggres-
sive role as structural referee, however, is based on a flawed consti-
tutional premise. 415 Professor Larry Kramer argues that "[a]ctive
judicial intervention to protect the states from Congress is consis-
tent with neither the original understanding [of the Constitution]
nor with more than two centuries of practice.1416 This position is
408. See id. at 286-87 (noting that states hold substantially greater power to
challenge Congress' exercise of its commerce power).
409. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 536 (1985) (enlarg-
ing federal powers of regulation).
410. See id. at 546-47.
411. See id. (finding distinctions between "integral" and "traditional" govern-
ment functions impractical).
412. See id. Courts remained quiet as to what the realistic likelihood of suc-
cess in reliance on political process might be. See id.
413. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (holding qualifications of
state officeholders to be states' realm to regulate); Seminole Tribe of Florida v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (prohibiting Congress from abrogating sovereign im-
munity of states); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (preventing Congress
from conscripting state officers to enforce federal regulatory program); see generally
Wechsler, supra note 399, at 546-59 (asserting that most important instrument that
protects states is "political tradition" that "imposes a burden of persuasion on
those favoring national intervention."). According to Wechsler, state governments
"are the strategic yardsticks for the measurement of interest and opinion, the spe-
cial centers of political activity, the separate geographical determinants of national
as well as local politics." Id. at 559; see generally Kramer, supra note 375, at 220-28.
414. SeeJackson, supra note 73, at 2231-46 (discussing federal regulation of
private activity).
415. See Kramer, supra note 396, at 289-90 (analyzing Court's justifications for
its stance).
416. Id.
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"backed by nothing except formal adherence to a fictitious concept
of monolithic judicial review that is wholly abstract and that does
not square with the original practice, reason, or subsequent experi-i-
ence."417 Furthermore, the Court provided no principled basis for
delineating the parameters of traditional state authority.41 8 The
Court should recognize that past efforts in this regard "have been
controversial failures that accomplished little other than to damage
the Court's reputation."4 19
IV. CONCLUSION
The reintroduction of the red wolf into Alligator River Na-
tional Wildlife Refuge in North Carolina generated conflict be-
tween the federal and state governments. 420 North Carolina
enacted a statute that permitted the taking of red wolves on private
land under more lenient conditions than the federal regulation. 421
Several individuals and counties brought suit, challenging the fed-
eral government's authority to prohibit the taking of the red wolf
on private property.422 The Fourth Circuit properly invalidated the
North Carolina statute and determined that the anti-taking regula-
tion was supported by the Commerce Clause.423
The red wolf is a migratory creature that is subject to federal
regulation as "a thing in interstate commerce. '4 24 Red wolves were
taken from captive breeding programs in the United States and re-
introduced into the federal refuge.425 Some wolves migrated off
federal land onto private property.426 If the reintroduction is suc-
cessful, the red wolves will migrate across state lines and repopulate
417. Id.
418. See id. at 289-93 (criticizing Supreme Court's approach); see alsoJackson,
supra note 73, at 2231-46 (suggesting Supreme Court should focus on a "necessary
and proper" analysis).
419. Kramer, supra note 396, at 290.
420. For a general discussion of the reintroduction conflicts between federal
and state governments, see supra notes 1-8 and 46-55 and accompanying text.
421. For a further discussion of the North Carolina statute permitting the
taking of red wolves on private lands, see supra note 4 and accompanying text.
422. For a further discussion of lawsuits challenging the federal government's
authority to prohibit the taking of red wolves on private land, see supra note 54 and
accompanying text.
423. See Gibbs II 214 F.3d at 506 (holding "[o]f course natural resource con-
servation is economic and commercial.").
424. For a further discussion of the migratory nature of the red wolf, see supra
notes 16-45 and accompanying text.
425. See id.
426. See id.
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the southeast region.4 27 The wolves' migration across state lines
subjects them to federal Commerce Clause authority.
The taking of the red wolf substantially affects interstate com-
merce.428 The anti-taking regulation is economic in nature and is
an intrinsic part of a larger economic regulatory statute. 429 Conse-
quently, the cumulative impact of the taking of the red wolves on
interstate commerce must be considered. 430 If there are no red
wolves, there will be no tourism, no scientific study and no future
pelt business. The absence of the red wolf decreases biodiversity
that may produce future products for interstate commerce and ef-
fects ecosystem management, which has significant interstate im-
pacts. 4 31 If the taking of the red wolf is permitted, states will lower
wildlife protection standards to attract business and precipitate a
race to the bottom.
The reasons behind red wolf extinction include farming,
ranching, and economic development, which are, in part, the result
of interstate commerce. These concerns were specifically ad-
dressed by Congress when it enacted ESA and by the courts both
before and since Lopez.432 The anti-taking regulation contains ade-
quate federal and state jurisdictional limits because only endan-
gered and threatened species are subject to federal regulation. 433
The states traditionally have regulated wildlife, but within the pa-
rameters of federal law.43 4
The Fourth Circuit's decision, in Gibbs, is important in light of
the Supreme Court's new emerging Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence. 43 5 In Lopez and in Morrison, the Court held that legislative
427. See Red Wolves of Alligator River, Frequently Asked Questions, available at
http://www.nczooredwolf.org (last visited Aug. 1, 2001). Total population of red
wolves, as of August 1999, was estimated at 245, while the wild population in North
Carolina was estimated at eighty-three. See id. Remaining red wolves were located
in 34 captive breeding facilities. See id.
428. For a further discussion of the effects of red wolf reintroduction on in-
terstate commerce, see supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
429. See id.
430. See id.
431. See Costanza et al., supra note 167, at 259 (noting "ecosystem services
provide an important portion of the total contribution to human welfare on this
planet. We must begin to give the natural capital stock that produces these ser-
vices adequate weight in the decision making process, otherwise current and con-
tinued future human welfare may drastically suffer.").
432. See 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a) (2000).
433. See generally 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531(a), 1531(c)(2) (2001).
434. See Boyd, supra note 142, at 1289.
435. See Daniel A. Farber, The Constitution's Forgotten Cover Letter: An Essay on the
New Federalsim and the Original Understanding, 94 MIcH. L. REV. 615, 625-26 (1995).
"New Federalism" rests on three premises. See id. First, states reserve important
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findings are unnecessary, but may be helpful in determining the
nexus between the regulated activity and interstate commerce. 436
The Fourth Circuit relied on informal legislative findings in ESA's
legislative history to support its conclusion that the taking of the
red wolf substantially affects interstate commerce. 437 This indicates
that the tools of statutory interpretation, including the text, intent
and purposes, will be important not only to determine statutory
meaning, but also to support the statute's constitutional justifica-
tion. 438 In addition, several commentators have noted that the
hard-look doctrine and clear statement principle "might sometimes
make a determinative difference in Commerce Clause cases."439
In Lopez and Morrison, the Supreme Court announced a new
aggressive posture regarding judicial review of federal statutes en-
acted pursuant to the Commerce Clause. The colloquy between
the dissent and majority, in Gibbs, regarding judicial activism dem-
onstrates some of the problems with the Court's new Commerce
Clause jurisprudence. Judge Luttig's dissent advocated strong judi-
cial activism in Commerce Clause cases.440 Judge Luttig found that
the taking of the red wolf is not an economic activity, and, even if it
can be considered an economic activity, the taking of the forty-one
red wolves living on private land does not substantially effect inter-
facets of their sovereignty. See id. Second, states retain an exclusive sphere of au-
thority upon which federal government may not intrude. See id. Third, federalism
possesses inherent values that must be protected. See id.
436. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562-63 (1995); United States v. Mor-
rison, 529 U.S. 598, 612 (2000).
437. See Gibbs II, 214 F.3d at 503 (discussing importance of understanding
ESA as "culmination of a long legislative process of trial and error.").
438. SeeJackson, supra note 73, at 2231-46 (discussing role of federalism and
stating Supreme Court's past processes for interpreting Constitution); see also
Frickey, supra note 10, at 713-20 (exploring relation between Congressional fact-
finding authority, relation between Congressional process and judicial statutory
interpretation techniques found in constitutional values, and relation between
Congressional process and judicial constitutional scrutiny); Krent, supra note 73, at
734-47 (discussing need for legislative fact-finding and its role in judicial review).
439. Morrison, 520 U.S. at 663 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that whether
Congress takes hard look might make determinative difference in Commerce
Clause); see also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991) (stating Congress
can only adjust "the usual constitutional balance between the States and Federal
Government" by making clear statement in statute); Lawrence Lessing, Translating
Federalism: U.S. v. Lopez, 1995 Sup. CT. Rv. 125, 194-214 (1995) (taking hard look at
Congress' enumerated powers, specifically Necessary and Proper Clause, as limit-
ing factor for Commerce Clause, as well as other factors, such as economic effects
and separation of powers); see generally Cass Sunstein, Deregulation and the Hard
Look Doctrine, 1983 Sup. CT. REv. 177.
440. See Gibbs II, 214 F.3d at 506 (Luttig, J., dissenting).
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state commerce. 44 1 Judge Luttig argued that the courts, not Con-
gress, should make these decisions. 442
This aggressive role for the courts, as arbiters of public policy,
poses a number of problems. First, the distinction between eco-
nomic and non-economic activities is difficult to establish and de-
pends upon how the activity is perceived.4 43 The case law cited by
the Supreme Court never rested upon this factor.4 44 This distinc-
tion reintroduces formalism into Commerce Clause determina-
tions, which has been rejected as unworkable in the past, for
example, the distinctions between production and commerce and
between direct and indirect effects. 445 Justice Breyer, dissenting in
Lopez, pointed out that focusing on the "nomenclature such as pro-
duction and indirect... forecloses consideration of the actual ef-
fects of the activity in question upon interstate commerce. ' '446
Second, the judgment as to whether an activity substantially af-
fects interstate commerce depends upon the focus of the statute
and the degree of aggregation. Almost all intrastate actions can be
aggregated to establish substantial interstate effects. 44 7 This is the
441. See id. at 508 (Luttig, J., dissenting) (asserting "[W] e do not have before
us an activity that has obvious economic character and impact, such as is typically
the case with non-wildlife natural resources, and even with other wildlife
resources.").
442. See Gibbs II, 214 F.3d at 506-10 (Luttig, J., dissenting) (characterizing de-
cision as judicial review of Congress' power under Commerce Clause and finding
Constitutional interpretation rests within judiciary).
443. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 565 (1995) (conceding that "de-
pending on the level of generality, any activity can be looked upon as commer-
cial."); see also Robert F. Nagel, The Future of Federalism, 46 CASE W. Rs. L. REv. 643,
648 (1996) (discussing Lopez, which distinguishes between commercial and non-
commercial activities); Shane, supra note 10, at 220-22 (stating that because activity
can be considered both commercial and noncommercial, depending on how one
looks at activity, it is impossible to create guidelines); Regan, supra note 231, at
555, 564-65 (stating distinctions between commercial and noncommercial activities
present in Lopez are gloss, not present in precedent, and noting definition of com-
merce is expansive); H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr., The Quixotic Search for a Judicially
Enforceable Federalism, 83 MINN. L. REv. 849, 887-88 (1999) (stating impossibilities of
formulating set guidelines for distinguishing between commercial and noncom-
mercial activities).
444. See Moulton, supra note 443, at 887 (stating precedent relies on various
factors and refuses to formulate strict rules).
445. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 627-31 (Breyer, J. dissenting) (stating earlier cases
warned against formulating guidelines); see also Morrison, 520 U.S. at 655-63 (re-
vealing it difficult to determine distinctions); Frickey, supra note 10, at 729 (stating
all situations are not analogous); Shane, supra note 10, at 222-23 (noting strict
formulations would exclude many activities); Kramer, supra note 375, at 292 (not-
ing Court should not define limits).
446. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 628 (citing Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 120
(1942)).
447. See Lino Graglia, United States v. Lopez: Judicial Review Under the Commerce
Clause, 74 TEX. L. REv. 719, 768-69 (1996) (stating question is degree to which activ-
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reality of living in a national interrelated economy and has allowed
Congress to address national problems that are not suited to indi-
vidual state remedies, such as loan sharking, racial discrimination,
and environmental protection. 448 Justice Breyer, in his dissent in
Lopez, recognized that the Commerce Clause is "an affirmative
power commensurate with national needs" and the "Commerce
Clause does not operate so as to render the nation powerless to
defend itself against economic forces that Congress decrees inimi-
cal or destructive of the national economy."4 4 9 Professor Kramer
commented that the Court might be able "to replace rigid lines that
establish a fixed domain of exclusive state jurisdiction with more
fluid tests that turn on some notion of functionality. But governing
a modern society is much too complicated [sic] the Court's prefer-
ences about where or how to draw the line to inspire much
confidence." 450
Third, Congress is institutionally better suited to make deter-
minations regarding federal-state authority.451 Congress possesses
superior fact finding capabilities and is comprised of representa-
tives who are accountable to state constituencies. Members of Con-
gress consult with state and local governments when enacting policy
and are responsible for protecting state and local authority. 452
Congress can protect the national interest by preserving natural re-
sources and determine the proper balance between environmental
ity affects interstate commerce); see also Frickey, supra note 10, at 719 (stating issue
is degree to which interstate commerce is affected).
448. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 655-63 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating it is world
where almost every product crosses state lines); see also Anthony Moscato, The Court
"Substantially Affects" Congress' Power to Regulate Interstate Commerce: U.S. v. Lopez, 21
U. DAYTON L. REv. 807, 831-32 (1995) (explaining modern age gives way to na-
tional, not isolated, effects); Jesse H. Choper, Did Last Term Reveal A Revolutionary
States Right Movement Within the Supreme Court?, 46 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 663, 669-70
(1996) (stating some levels of government are not competent to deal with national
problems); see generally, Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971)(addressing de-
fendant's conviction for extorting money in violation of Title II of Consumer
Credit Protection Act); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241
(1964) (addressing hotel's discrimination of black interstate travelers); Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981) (explain-
ing how local mining activities affect interstate commerce).
449. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 625 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
450. Kramer, supra note 396, at 289.
451. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 604 (Souter, J., dissenting). For a contrary argu-
ment, see Steven G. Calabresi, A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers: In
Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752, 823-31 (1995).
452. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 661; Regan, supra note 231, at 585-86; Wechsler,
supra note 313, at 558-60. For a refutation of Wechsler's particulars, but concur-
rence with Wechsler's conclusions, see Kramer, supra note 396.
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protection and property rights. 453 The proper forum for resolving
this policy dispute is Congress. 454 Professor Tiefer noted that "[i]t
is for Congress to decide, after a national discourse, whether chang-
ing conditions affect the national environment; that involves issues
beyond the competence of courts." 455
Fourth, the existence of enclaves of traditional state authority
that are immune from federal regulation rests on questionable con-
stitutional history. Federal-state relations have changed in response
to national conditions.456 There is no clearly delineated zone of
traditional state authority that is exempt from federal regulation. 45 7
Neither the Constitution nor the Supreme Court provides any gui-
dance regarding the parameters of this protected zone. 458 Profes-
sor Kramer declared that there is no "clear constitutional mandate
demanding judicial intercession .... More than two centuries of
successful federalism without the aid of an aggressive judiciary sug-
gests that no such intercession is needed. 459
Finally, the Court must not substitute its own policy prefer-
ences for those of Congress.460 In the past, the Court invoked fed-
eralism to support laissez-faire economics. 461 Federalism is now
being brandished to limit national government authority.462 The
Court obviously sees very little risk in pursuing this goal under the
protection of a Republican Congress and now a Republican Presi-
dent, but this political constellation will not remain constant.463
One day the Court will be facing a Democratic Congress and Presi-
dent, which may be less enthusiastic regarding the invalidation of
statutes and policy positions such as gun control, gender violence,
and environmental protection that their constituents support. The
453. See Gibbs II, 214 F.3d at 504-06.
454. See id.
455. Tiefer, supra note 10, at 10893.
456. See Kramer, supra note 396, at 290.
457. See Lessing, supra note 439, at 195-96, 206.
458. SeeJackson, supra note 73, at 2231-46; Kramer, supra note 375, at 289-93;
Regan, supra note 231, 566-67; Moulton, supra note 443, at 851.
459. Kramer, supra note 396, at 291; see also, Larry D. Kramer, But When Exactly
Was Judicially Enforced Federalism 'Born'in the First Place?, 22 HARv. J. L. & PUB. PoL'v
123, 133-37 (1996).
460. See Shane, supra note 10, at 223-43.
461. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 603-15 (1995) (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
462. See Moulton, supra note 443, at 892-93.
463. See William N. Eskridge, Post-Enactment Legislative Signals, 57 LAw & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 75 (1994) (stating positive political theory views political institutions
as rational actors who cooperate and compete to have their policy preferences
prevail); Daniel A. Farber and Philip P. Frickey, Forward: Positive Political Theory in
the Nineties, 80 GEo. L.J. 457, 462 (1992); Friedman, supra note 10, at 776-84.
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Supreme Court has gone down this road in the past and "is ignor-
ing the painful lesson learned in 1937."464
The majority decision, in Gibbs, effectively demonstrated that
Lopez does not necessarily condemn federal environmental stat-
utes.465 In an earlier case, Judge Wilkinson, the author of the Gibbs
decision, applauded the Supreme Court's new judicial activism re-
garding the Commerce Clause, but also recognized that it is a
"grave judicial act to nullify the product of the democratic process
.... [R] espect for institutions of self-government requires defer-
ence to the action of legislative bodies."466 Offering some astute
advice, Judge Wilkinson stated:
maintaining the integrity of the enumerated powers does
not mean that statutes will topple like falling dominos.
Rather, the values of federalism must be tempered by the
maxims of prudence and restraint .... A wholesale invali-
dation of environmental, civil rights, and business regula-
tion would signal a different and disturbing regime-one
464. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 609 (Souter, J., dissenting).
465. See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs,
531 U.S. 159 (2001) [hereinafter SWANCC] (indicating that such optimism might
be misplaced). The Corps developed the migratory bird rule which held that iso-
lated bodies of waters that provided habitat for migratory birds were subject to
federal regulation. See Final Rule, Consolidation of Army Corps of Engineers Per-
mit Regulations, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,217 (Nov. 13, 1986). Most of the circuit courts
that reviewed the migratory bird rule found that migratory birds provided a suffi-
cient nexus with interstate commerce to make isolated waters subject to federal
regulation. See Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388 (9th Cir. 1995); see also
Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. EPA, 999 F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1997). The Supreme Court,
in SWANCC, relied on statutory interpretation and rejected the migratory bird
rule, holding that Congress did not intend the definition of navigable waters to
include isolated wetlands. See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 171-73. The Court also recog-
nized Commerce Clause problems and indicated that Lopez would not support the
migratory bird rule. See id. The Court noted that "[p]ermitting respondents to
claim federal jurisdiction over ponds and mudflats falling within the 'Migratory
Bird Rule' would result in a significant impingement of the State's traditional and
primary power over land and water use." Id. at 174.
Justice Stevens in his dissent supported the view that the Gibbs majority
adopted. Justice Stevens held that the discharge of fill into isolated waterways "will,
in the aggregate, adversely affect migratory bird populations." Id. at 194. People
"participate in bird watching and hunting and that those activities generate a host
of commercial activities of great value." Id. at 195. Consequently, "the causal con-
nection between the filling of wetlands and the decline of commercial activities
associated with migratory birds is not 'attenuated."' Id. Furthermore, the migra-
tory bird rule does not blur the "distinction between what is truly national and
what is truly local." Id. at 195. See also, Rob Strang, Gibbs v. Babbitt: The Taking of
Red Wolves on Private Land, a Post Lopez Challenge to the Endangered Species Act, 14 TUL.
ENVrL. L.J. 229 (2000).
466. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. and State Univ., 169 F.3d 820, 890
(4th Cir. 1999); see also Shane, supra note 10.
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other than that which we have now. If modern activism
accelerates to a gallop, then this era will go the way of its
discredited forbearer. 467
467. Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 897-98; see alsoJ. Harvie Wilkinson, The Role of Rea-
son in the Rule of Law, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 779, 801-09 (1989).
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